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Abstract
Numerous decision-making barriers prevent or delay climate and extreme
weather resilience investments. Port decision-makers’ perceptions of such
barriers are important for proactive strategies for reducing coastal
vulnerability and supporting safe and sustainable operations of U.S. ports.
This report identifies the perceived adaptation barriers for seaports, and
strategies to remove them. Interviews with 30 directors/managers,
environmental specialists, and safety planners at 15 medium- and high-use
ports of the North Atlantic resulted in a typology of factors and conditions
that hamper adaptation actions, planning, and perceived strategies to
overcome these barriers.
This study finds that the decision-makers have consensus on seven
overarching barriers to adaptation: the lack of understanding of the risks
(93%), lack of funding (77%), perceived levels of risks do not exceed the
action threshold (70%), governance disconnect (67%), physical constraints
(67%), lack of communication amongst individuals (7%), and the problem
(of adaptation) is overwhelming (7%).
For strategies to overcome the adaptation barriers, the study points to the
importance of fostering collaborations, making regulatory changes, and
conducting risk assessments. Port decision-makers also mentioned the
need for developing financial incentives and taking advantage of
communication networks as necessary strategies to implement climate
and extreme weather adaptations.

DISCLAIMER: The contents of this report are not to be used for advertising, publication, or promotional purposes.
Citation of trade names does not constitute an official endorsement or approval of the use of such commercial products.
All product names and trademarks cited are the property of their respective owners. The findings of this report are not to
be construed as an official Department of the Army position unless so designated by other authorized documents.
DESTROY THIS REPORT WHEN NO LONGER NEEDED. DO NOT RETURN IT TO THE ORIGINATOR.
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Executive Summary
Stakeholders of the maritime transportation system are becoming more
aware of the importance of building and strengthening the resilience of
coastal infrastructure. Heavy rains, storms, sea level rise, and extreme
heat damage coastal critical infrastructures (Melillo et al. 2014). The
frequency, intensity, timing, duration, and location of such climate and
extreme weather events will define how the U.S. maritime transportation
system experiences future impacts. However, information on barriers to
building resilience for ports is limited.
Climate change studies stress that decision-making barriers slow the
development and implementation of much-needed adaptation strategies
(Moser and Ekstrom 2010; Biesbroek et al. 2011). For this reason,
examining decision-maker perceptions of adaptation barriers is key to the
implementation of plans and effort to reduce risks and build the resilience
of ports.
Barriers are defined as factors or conditions that impede, prevent, or
delay processes for the development and implementation of climate
change adaptation strategies (Biesbroek et al. 2011). Barriers to resilience
investment include underestimating true risk levels, lack of financing, lack
of awareness, and misaligned incentives (Moser and Ekstrom 2010;
Biesbroek et al. 2011). At the national and global levels, trade and
development rely on the efficient operation of maritime transportation1.
Still, decision-makers have not yet made sufficient investments towards
climate and extreme weather resilience (Biesbroek et al. 2011), as seen
recently with the aftermath of Hurricane Sandy at the port of New York
and New Jersey (Greene et al. 2013; Becker et al. 2014; Becker 2016; Ng et
al. 2016), and earlier in Gulfport, MS, during Hurricane Katrina (2005)
(USDOT 2013). Differences in stakeholders’ risk perceptions can be a
source of conflict in the deliberations and planning. This research focuses
on identifying the perceived barriers and how three categories of key port
decision-makers think about those barriers, as well as about the strategies
needed to overcome them.

1

Asariotis, R., H. Benamara, and V. Mohos-Naray. 2017. Port Industry Survey on Climate Change Impacts
and Adaptation. UNCTAD Research Paper No. 18. United Nations Conference on Trade and
Development.
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This study characterizes the barriers to climate and extreme weather
adaptations for ports and suggests approaches to develop adaptation
strategies that encourage long-term resilience planning. Adaptation
strategies minimize vulnerability to natural hazards (Nicholls et al. 2008).
Reactive mitigation, currently the dominant adaptation strategy
(Measham et al. 2011), leaves coastal communities at risk and threatens
the stability of their economy, environment, and human safety. Hence,
seaport planners and managers need to plan, implement, and monitor
pro-active adaptations to enhance the resilience of these ports
(DHS 2009).
This work is part of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) Project
W912HZ-16-C-0019 entitled “Measuring Climate and Extreme Weather
Vulnerability to Inform Resilience.” This report captures the first of a twopart study. In the first part of the study (McIntosh et al. [2019], Measuring
Climate and Extreme Weather Vulnerability to Inform Resilience: Report
1: Pilot Study for North Atlantic Medium- and High-Use Maritime
Freight Nodes), experts ranked higher the use of exposure and sensitivity
indicators as measures of ports vulnerability. This report is a summary of
the second part of the study. It focuses on adaptive capacity — the third
component of vulnerability — and in particular on barriers to adaptation.
To identify seaport decision-makers’ perceived barriers to adaptations,
port directors/managers, environmental specialists and safety planners in
15 of the 22 medium- and high-use ports of the USACE North Atlantic
Division were interviewed. Researchers also asked decision-makers about
resources and strategies that could help remove the barriers to adaptation.
A cultural consensus model (CCM) characterizes the barriers identified
during the interviews within the larger context of the port community’s
resilience. The CCM measures levels of agreement for the top barriers
identified by the participating decision-makers.
Outlining how the decision-makers perceive those barriers is fundamental
for implementing actions to reduce risk and enhance the port’s resilience.
Climate change studies stress that decision-making barriers slow the
development and implementation of much-needed adaptation strategies
(Moser and Ekstrom 2010; Biesbroek et al. 2011). Other studies have
relied on stakeholders’ views to assess flood risk (Van Kleef et al. 2007),
impacts of sea level rise (SLR) (Poumadère et al. 2008), as well as how
stakeholders are impacted by the strike of storms (Becker et al. 2014).
Already, ports and critical coastal infrastructures are damaged by heavy
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rains, storms, SLR, and extreme heat damage (Melillo et al. 2014). To
illustrate the challenge of adaptation, Moser and Ekstrom (2010) defined
how the barriers can appear in different phases, from (1) the
Understanding phase, (2) the Planning phase, and (3) the Management
phase. Some studies indicate that there will always be barriers to
adaptation, but that, different from a limitation, by definition, a barrier
can be overcome through planning efforts, creative thinking, and the
prioritizations of resources (Moser and Ekstrom 2010).
The following paragraphs present findings from this study, including
barriers to adaptation, followed by the strategies that can help them
overcome the identified barriers and concluding with recommendations to
the U.S. Army Engineer Research and Development Center, and port
decision-makers. By connecting the barriers to adaptation and the
strategies needed to address them, this pilot study provides a framework
to guide future port adaptation capacity-building actions.

Seven perceived barriers
This study identified and then measured consensus on seven perceived
barriers to adaptation to climate and extreme weather (see figure on
following page). It focused on three principle decision-maker types at
medium- and high-use ports on the North Atlantic Coast: port directors,
environmental specialists, and safety planners. Perceived barriers
identified by this group include (1) the lack of understanding of the risks,
(2) lack of funding, (3) perceived levels of risks do not exceed the action
threshold, (4) governance disconnect, (5) physical constraints, (6) lack of
communication amongst individuals, and (7) the problem (of adaptation)
is overwhelming.
A higher percentage of port directors identified lack of
understanding and governance disconnect in their responses
about barriers; a higher percentage of the environmental
specialists highlighted the lack of understanding and the
physical constraints of the ports as barriers; and more safety
planners mentioned the lack of funding and perceived risks do
not exceed the action threshold as the barriers of concern (see
figure on following page).
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Seven barriers to climate and extreme weather adaptations resulted from 30 interviews in 15
North Atlantic ports. The value above each color is the percentage of respondents that
mentioned that barrier within the decision-makers category (directors/managers,
environmental specialists, safety planners). Blue numbers represent the total frequency of
the responses (n = 30). Blue represents the overall percentage of responses for a barrier.
(Graph credit: J. Menendez Lopez).

Five strategies to address barriers
The respondents also identified five strategies that could help them
address the barriers to adaptation: (1) foster collaborations, (2) make
regulatory changes, (3) conduct risk assessments, (4) develop financial
incentives, and (5) use new technology to enhance communication
network (see figure on following page).
A higher number of directors and environmental specialists
highlighted the importance of fostering collaborations and
making regulatory changes to encourage resilience planning.
Safety planners agreed, and they highlighted the need to
conduct risk assessments (see figure on following page).
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Five strategies to overcome barriers to climate and extreme weather adaptations resulted
from 30 interviews in 15 North Atlantic ports. The value above each color is the percentage of
respondents that mentioned that strategy within the decision-makers category
(directors/managers, environmental specialists, safety planners). Red numbers represent the
total frequency of the responses (n = 30). Red represents the overall percentage of
responses for a barrier. (Graph credit: J. Menendez Lopez).

Key recommendations
Addressing the barriers relies on private and public port entities to
communicate and collaborate at the local, state, and national levels with
institutions and agencies that have a vested interest in the ports. To
address barriers to adaptation at the port level, this study recommends for
USACE, policy makers, and other institutions do the following: (1) make
regulatory changes to encourage resilience and provide financial
incentives, (2) integrate risk assessment into the port management plan or
conduct independent risk management assessment, (3) establish working
groups and emergency response strategies for different natural hazards
(flood barriers, etc.), and (4) enhance learning and data availability
through collaborations (organizations, academics, government, etc.).
Directors and managers can play leadership roles in directing the
environmental specialists and the safety planners to work together on risk
assessment reports for the ports. The environmental specialists and the
safety planners can promote the establishment of partnerships and
collaborations that enable them to learn from ports that have more
experience with storms, floods, or other natural hazards.
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More work is needed to integrate a larger number of port stakeholders in
the conversation, to make clear connections not only on what the barriers to
adaptation are but also on who has the responsibility to remove them.
Efforts should expand to understand risks at the port and their neighboring
communities. The development of the approach and research methods used
in this study can be used in other regions to measure consensus on barriers
to adaptation and the strategies needed to overcome them.
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1

Introduction
Coastal communities are experiencing worsening impacts from climate
change-related natural hazards (Melillo et al. 2014). Although changes in
the climate and extreme weather events are inevitable (Melillo et al. 2014;
IPCC 2012), the magnitude of the damage to coastal areas and the critical
infrastructure located there can be reduced through the implementation of
climate and extreme weather adaptations (Füssel 2007). Seaports are
critical infrastructure. At the national and global levels, trade and
development rely on the efficient operation of maritime transportation1.
To sustain these operations, it is vital that port decision-makers
understand the risks and plan for potential impact. Because U.S. port
resilience planning currently falls primarily upon port operators (Becker
and Caldwell 2015), those equipped with knowledge about adaptation
strategies can minimize their vulnerability to natural hazards (Nicholls et
al. 2008).
Over a decade ago, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
(IPCC) remarked that there were “research challenges in understanding
the processes by which adaptation is occurring and will occur in the
future”(IPCC 2007). Social scientists, in response, researched barriers to
climate change adaptation and are developing theories to help understand
them (Moser and Ekstrom 2010). Recent investigations stress that
decision-making barriers slow the implementation of adaptation strategies
(Moser and Ekstrom 2010; Biesbroek et al. 2011; Becker 2013). Such
barriers include underestimating risk levels, lack of financing, lack of
awareness, and misaligned incentives (Moser and Ekstrom 2010;
Biesbroek et al. 2011).
This research builds on these theories of resilience barriers and ground
truth findings from the indicator-based vulnerability assessment
methodology developed for the 22 seaports that fall within the boundaries
of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) North Atlantic Division
(CENAD) (McIntosh et al. 2018). Through literature reviews, a
compilation of databases, and an iterative, expert-driven process, a
1

Asariotis, R., H. Benamara, and V. Mohos-Naray. 2017. Port Industry Survey on Climate Change Impacts
and Adaptation. UNCTAD Research Paper No. 18. United Nations Conference on Trade and
Development.
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vulnerability indicator method that integrates 12 specific indicators was
used for a comparative assessment of the vulnerability of the 22 ports in
the North Atlantic (McIntosh et al. 2018). The indicators selected by the
expert panel identified aspects of exposure and sensitivity, which are just
two of the three components that comprise the concept of vulnerability
(IPCC 2001). The final component, adaptive capacity, was not included in
the index project, as no suitable indicators could be found for adaptive
capacity. Hence, this research focuses on decision-makers’ perceived
barriers to adaptation for climate and extreme weather and considers
adaptive capacity from the perspective of the perceived needs and
challenges port decision-makers face when considering implementation of
resilience investments. Specifically, what are the barriers preventing the
integration of adaptive capacity to reduce the risk from climate and
extreme weather events?
To identify seaport decision-makers’ perceived barriers to climate and
extreme weather adaptations, this project interviewed 30 port
directors/managers, environmental specialists, and safety planners from
15 of the 22 medium- and high-use ports within the USACE North Atlantic
Division (Figure 2). The remaining seven ports declined when invited to
participate. This project focuses on ports but recognizes that barriers to
adaptation also need to be considered in the context of a larger system.
Through analysis of the interviews and a literature review on barriers and
strategies to climate adaptation, a port-specific typology of barriers to
climate and extreme weather adaptation was developed.
Following the Abstract and the Executive Summary of this report, Chapter
1 introduces the study, and Chapters 2 and 3 outline the objectives and the
methods used to identify the key barriers to adaptation and the strategies
to help port decision-makers overcome them. The report next describes
the steps for the data analysis. Once the barriers were coded, a cultural
consensus model (CCM) was used to identify and outline gaps and
patterns of socially transmitted knowledge — the knowledge people use to
interpret the world in making decisions that affect coastal cities and
beyond (Romney et al. 1987).
The study also explored resources and strategies that the decision-makers
identified as essential to helping them overcome the perceived barriers.
Suggestions are offered on the role decision-makers could play to facilitate
and implement the various strategies. Results for the different decision-
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maker categories are presented in Chapter 4. Chapter 5 discusses the
barriers and the strategies to address them. The final section includes
recommendations for resilience planning for port decision-makers, with
the support of other agencies and organizations, and recommendations for
future work (Chapter 6).
Additionally, to further ground truth aspects of the seaport vulnerability
indicator methodology developed by (McIntosh et al. 2018), interview
questions on how decision-makers perceive seaport vulnerability in the
context of climate and extreme weather were included. In brief, the
assessment finds that 80% of the 30 respondents explain port
vulnerability in terms of only exposure and sensitivity — these are two of
the vulnerability components, and only 30% talked about seaport
vulnerability in terms of the third component, adaptive capacity. The
responses by the directors and the environmental specialists followed the
pattern mentioned above. However, safety planners explained
vulnerability in terms of all three components, including adaptive capacity,
more than the other decision-makers (80%, 4/5). More details are
presented in Appendix A.
This research responds to the call to increase resilience and protect
national critical infrastructure (Obama 2013) by assessing perceived
barriers to extreme weather adaptation for ports. These study results can
assist government agencies and port operators to understand and prepare
for extreme weather events for the benefit of all who depend on a resilient
maritime transportation system.

1.1

Barriers to climate and extreme weather adaptation
1.1.1

How are barriers defined?

The research in this study addresses barriers to adapt ports and port
systems to the impacts of climate change, sea level rise (SLR), more
frequent storms, increased storm intensity, and other extreme weather
events. In 2007, the IPCC noted there were barriers that could impede
implementation of climate change adaptation. At that time, barrier was
defined as “any obstacle to reaching a potential that can be overcome by
policies and measures,” or as challenges that impede adaptation (IPCC
2007, Section 2.4.3). Barriers are often discussed in tandem with the term
opportunity — “the application of technologies or policies to reduce costs
and barriers, [to] find new potentials and increase existing ones” (IPCC
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2007, Section 2.4.3.1). This potential for barriers and opportunities can
vary across places and over time because they tend to be context specific
(IPCC 2007).
In this study, barriers1 are factors and conditions that impede, prevent, or
delay processes for the development and implementation of climate
change adaptation strategies for seaport systems (Biesbroek et al. 2011). In
the literature, examples of these barriers include uncertainty, the cost of
adaptation measures, fragmentation, rigidity, unawareness, lack of data,
lack of national attention to climate change (Smith et al. 2009), as well as
socio-cultural barriers and institutional barriers to action (Burch 2010).
While research suggests that such barriers can be “overcome with
concerted effort and creative management (Moser and Ekstrom 2010),
there is no specific guidance for barriers that seaport decision-makers
might face.
The challenge is that barriers “make adaptation efforts less efficient” and
more difficult to achieve progress towards adaptation (Biesbroek et al.
2011; Huang 2012; Ekstrom and Moser 2014). As a result, some
researchers have developed frameworks to diagnose barriers to climate
change adaptation with a focus on planned adaptation (Moser and
Ekstrom 2010). As the backdrop to identifying where barriers to adaption
arise, they use an idealized stage for an adaptation planning process that
includes (1) understanding the problem, (2) planning an option, and (3)
managing or monitoring the effects of their actions. Ekstrom and Moser
later tested the theoretical framework focusing on three potential sources
of barriers: the actors (making decisions), the context (social, economic, or
biophysical), and the system that is at risk of being impacted. Through
these efforts, they found the most frequent barriers to be related to
institutional governance and funding concerns. Additionally, these
identified barriers were influenced by the attitudes, values, and
motivations of the actors involved. Others agree that barriers are relative
to a specific adaptive action, to the actor that can put them forward, and to
the situation in which the action is taken (Eisenack and Stecker 2012;
Moser and Ekstrom 2010).

1

The definition of barriers and the main terminology used throughout this report can be found in
Appendix E.
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1.1.2

Some examples of barriers

In the academic literature on climate adaptation, the most frequently
reported barriers relate to the institutional and social dimensions building
resilience. Barriers can relate to how risk is understood in the context of
planning for, managing, and implementing resilience strategies (Moser
and Ekstrom 2010) or as a function of where they arise in the adaptation
process (Biesbroek et al. 2013). Social barriers to adaptation relate to
challenges in institutional governance (Ekstrom and Moser 2014) or the
persistent problem of institutional fragmentation (Ekstrom and Moser
2014; Huitema et al. 2008), especially inside multi-entity organizations
where different sectors need to interact and communicate to implement
adaptation strategies. Other barriers are described as technical, for
example when staff lacks the expertise or training to address a problem, or
biophysical limitations, for example an absence of information on the
biology or physical landscapes that leads to maladaptation (Moser and
Ekstrom 2010).
Barriers can also be linked to specific planning actions and include scarce
financial resources, limited training, conflicting timescales, governance
fragmentation, the uncertainty of societal costs, or the future benefits of
adaptations (Biesbroek et al. 2011). As an example, conflicting timescales
happen when other issues have a more pressing nature and decisionmakers are confronted with what to prioritize first. In general, the
“traditional long-term planning [horizon] found in strategic policy
documents (20 to 30 years) is preferred to having to plan for the long-term
impacts of (an uncertain) climate change (100 years or more)”(Biesbroek
et al. 2011). Lack, or inaccessibility, of resources can also be a significant
barrier to climate adaptation (Füssel 2007), as many adaptation strategies
are very expensive and have less-clear direct benefits.
In the context of decision-making, identifying barriers to climate change
adaptations can be challenging due to factors such as the differences
between the long-term impacts of climate change versus the short-term
weather patterns; the need for better scientific models for predictions; and
the inherent uncertainties of climate (Biesbroek et al. 2013).
In responding to what these barriers are, researchers also seek to explain
society’s ability to overcome barriers, and many studies categorize barriers
to help determine where appropriate interventions can be targeted (Moser
and Ekstrom 2010; Biesbroek et al. 2011; Biesbroek et al. 2013; Ekstrom
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and Moser 2014). In general, studies suggest that barriers to adaptation
need to be understood in the context of society’s ability to address them
(Burton 2009; Adger et al. 2008), recognizing a latent adaptive capacity
that is best explained as inaction (Biesbroek et al. 2013).
For ports, a number of barriers to climate adaptation have been evaluated
(Becker and Caldwell 2015). These barriers include “organizational
inconsistencies with regards to planning timeframes (5 - 15 years)
compared with climate projections of 30 - 90 years”; then, there is the
uncertainty of local climate projections that results in decision-makers
delaying action until a later time — when there is perceived to be more
certainty.
There will always be barriers to change, but barriers can be transformed.
While a limitation is considered to be “absolute and unsurpassable,”
barriers are “mutable and surmountable” (Moser and Ekstrom 2010). To
achieve successful adaptations, decision-makers need to not only
understand the issues but also to increase their ability to navigate the
labyrinth of barriers that emerge in the governance of adaptation (Adger
and Barnett 2009; Adger et al. 2009; Moser and Ekstrom 2010)

1.2

Strategies to overcome the barriers to climate and extreme
weather adaptations
Adaptation, as defined by the IPCC, means “any adjustment in natural or
human systems in response to actual or expected climatic stimuli or their
effects, which moderates harm or exploits beneficial opportunities” (IPCC
2012). In this study, adaptation to climate and extreme weather is defined
as actions decision-makers implement to respond to a predicted or
projected natural hazard impact. These actions reduce the risk and
increase the resilience of the port and are generally part of an ongoing
process. Unfortunately, adaptation actions often take the form of reactive
mitigation (after an event) rather than pro-active actions (before an event
occurs). This adaptation strategy, though dominant (Measham et al. 2011),
leaves coasts and communities vulnerable to future impacts (Measham et
al. 2011; Burch 2010). For this reason, decision-making, adaptation
strategies that overcome barriers can benefit from “leadership strategic
thinking, resourcefulness, creativity, collaboration and effective
communication” (Moser and Ekstrom 2011).
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In 2011, the United Kingdom Climate Impact Program used a
risk/vulnerability approach to understand climate adaptations. It integrated
current-day vulnerabilities to extreme weather events with an assessment of
future climatic risks and resulted in two adaptation categories (Scott et al.
2013). The first builds capacity for future changes through awareness
raising, skill development, data collecting, monitoring and research, and the
second implements adaptation initiatives such as technological, engineering
changes, planning, design, legal/regulatory, insurance/financial measures,
and management system change (UKCIP 2011).
States that have experienced disasters are already at the forefront of
climate change policy. For example, in 2011, after severe storms and floods
of 2010, the state of Rhode Island formed a state Climate Commission
(RICCC 2012) and adopted an SLR policy for the state (in draft form at the
time of the interviews) (CRMC 2009).
In 2012, researchers published work on “transformational adaptation”
strategies (Kates et al. 2012). These are strategies that are much larger in
scale and may transform a place or initiate a major shift in location (Kates
et al. 2012).
Although in recent years the number of studies on adaptation in the
context of climate has increased on scientific and policy agendas (Adger et
al. 2007), numerous researchers have tried to explain the commonly
observed “adaptation deficit”(Burton 2009) when needed adaptations are
identified but their implementation is missing. The National Research
Council notes that this deficit in adaptation is not only observed for
developing countries but also in developed nations (NRC 2010).

1.3

Strategies for seaports
Seaports facilitate the exchange of goods and benefit for regional and
national economies and social systems. Ports serve many different
stakeholders and contribute to diverse goals that include “providing
economic benefits, environmental protection, improving quality of life,
reducing tax burdens, facilitating trade,” etc. (Winkelmans and Notteboom
2007). Therefore, when a natural disaster strikes a port, many
stakeholders are affected directly and indirectly (Becker et al 2014).
In a recent study, surveyed port administrators around the world felt that
adaptation measures should be taken into account when ports construct
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new infrastructure (Becker et al. 2011). Mississippi offers a recent
example. After Hurricane Katrina destroyed the port of Gulfport, the port
authority adopted a plan to elevate the entire infrastructure from 10 feet to
25 feet above mean sea level to enhance resilience to storms. In this case,
$140 million was proposed to invest in structural resilience (Becker and
Caldwell 2015). However, this strategy was never implemented, and funds
originally allocated for the project were redirected to a channel dredging
project so that the port could accommodate larger vessels.
Indeed, port adaptation measures can be a non-trivial investment of
resources, and studies suggest that assessment of resilience strategies can
benefit by understanding the needs of a wide range of stakeholders (Moser
and Ekstrom 2010). One study, focused on coastal seaports, found that port
operators, port tenants, and representatives from the public policy sector,
academia, and community groups had a role to play in climate change
adaptation (Becker et al. 2013a). Further, because natural disasters at ports
can affect stakeholders directly and indirectly (Becker et al. 2014), a range
of perceptions provides current (or historical) locally relevant data. Also,
stakeholder’s engagement and participation can lead to more effective
adaptation (Wilbanks and Kates 1999; Eakin and Luers 2006).
For a coastal infrastructure, the ways in which these can adapt to the
imminent risks of climate and extreme weather events are by protecting
their infrastructure, by elevating their piers and facilities, by designing for
submersion, or by abandoning the infrastructure (Becker et al. 2013)
(Figure 1).
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Figure 1. Four levels of port adaptation strategies: Protect, Elevate, Design for
Submersion, and Abandon (Images: Protect, photo by www.dutchwatersector.com;
Elevate, author unknown; Design for Submersion, Alabama State Port Authority;
Abandon, Dan Cuellar 2012.)

At the policy level, to advance the adaptation of ports, policies could
include the development of vulnerability assessment plans or
incorporating resilience goals into the standard operations and
management programs. Some ports could benefit from the acquisition of
adjacent lands and properties or the acquisition of insurance coverage
(Becker and Caldwell 2015). Becker and Caldwell (2015) found port
stakeholder’s strategies for resilience clustered into seven categories:
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Building codes and land use regulations
Long-range planning
Construction and design strategies (on and off port lands)
Private sector and insurance policies
Emergency preparations, response, and recovery
Research
Networks and new ways of thinking.
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Ongoing, “todays needs and options” to address adaptation and resilience
efforts “will depend on investments and decisions made in the past”
(Crabbé and Robin 2006; Hallegatte 2009).

10

ERDC/CHL CR-19-??

2

Research Objectives
This study collected data from 30 port decision-makers, representing 15
ports, on their perceptions of the barriers to climate and extreme weather
adaptation and the strategies to help them overcome these barriers. It
used a grounded theory approach (Glaser and Strauss 1967; Charmaz
2006) to develop the categorical classification for port-specific typology of
adaptation barriers. This research also used a CCM (Caulkins and Hyatt
1999; Romney et al. 1987) to assess port decision-makers’ level of
agreement on climate and extreme weather impacts in the North Atlantic.
It identified barriers to climate and extreme weather adaptation and
assessed concepts of vulnerability as perceived by port decision-makers.
Further, it defined knowledge and perception trends and gaps that local
port authorities and policy makers can use to help in resilience planning
and in developing extreme weather adaptation strategies for their ports.
The two main goals of this research are the following:
•

•

Understand how port decision-makers perceive barriers to climate and
extreme weather adaptation in the North Atlantic and how these
perceptions relate to those identified in other studies on this topic
Highlight decision-makers’ perceptions of strategies that can help in
overcoming these barriers
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3

Research Activities and Methods
To assess port-specific barriers to adaptation to climate and extreme
weather for the 15 ports within the CENAD, this project used a combined
qualitative and quantitative approach to collect data:
1. Review literature on types and classification of barriers to climate and
extreme weather adaptations.
2. Interview port decision-makers on their perceptions of the barriers1 to
adaptation and the strategies to address these.
3. Use a grounded theory approach to develop a typology of barriers to
adaptation, and cluster barriers into categories.
4. Implement a CCM to measure consensus on barriers to adaptation.
In addition to describing a typology of barriers based on the decisionmakers’ responses and listing their responses on strategies to address
these, this study considered how different decision-maker groups
(directors/managers, environmental specialists, safety planners) perceive
barriers differently.

3.1

Study location
This research uses 15 of the 22 medium-use and high-use ports (McIntosh
et al. 2019) ports within the U.S.Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) North
Atlantic Division2 (CENAD), consistent with the sample population
utilized for developing extreme weather and climate vulnerability
indicators by McIntosh et al. (2019, Figure 2). The U.S. Army Engineer
Research and Development Center is interested in piloting port resilience
and vulnerability assessment methods with high-use ports3. By adding
medium-use ports and restricting the selection to the North Atlantic
Before the interviews, the interview protocol and procedures were approved by the Institute of Review
Board (IRB) at the University of Rhode Island (IRB Approved 894694-8). This standard protocol
required that interviewees be informed of the purpose of the study and that they give a written or oral
consent to being interviewed and being recorded (for transcription purposes only). The majority of
interviews (73%, 22/30) were conducted in person, 27% were conducted over the phone, 10 of the
ports were visited.
2 The North Atlantic Division is one of nine USACE divisions and encompasses the U.S. Eastern Seaboard
from Virginia to Maine USACE. 2014. USACE Civil Works Division Boundaries.
http://geoplatform.usace.army.mil/home/item.html?id=c3695249909c45a2b2e2c3993aff3edb. U.S.
Army Corps of Engineers.
1

3

Dr. Julie Rosati, U.S. Army Engineer Research and Development Center, Coastal and Hydraulics
Laboratory, Personal communication, February 2015.
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region, researchers could create a manageable sample of 22 ports. The
proximity of these ports to the University of Rhode Island allowed for site
visits and interviews.
Figure 2. The 22 medium-use (blue dots) and high-use (magenta dots)
ports in the North Atlantic per 2015 USACE CENAD data.

3.2

Study participants
Many climate adaptation studies focus on stakeholders — those who can
affect or be affected by achievement of an organization’s objectives
(Freeman 1984). This study focuses on three types of stakeholders who
have expertise and decision-making roles within the port: port
directors/managers, safety planners, and environmental specialists. The
responsibilities of each group are listed in Table 1.
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Table 1. Description of responsibilities of decision-maker positions.
Position
Directors or managers
Common titles
- executive director
- director of operations
- project manager

Number
Interviewed
17

Responsibilities
•
•
•
•
•

Environmental specialists
Common titles:
- marine environment
and civil engineering consultant
- manager of strategic planning
- harbor master
- environmental manager
- project manager - climate
mitigation and resilience
manager

8

Safety planners
Common titles
- vice president of sustainability
(consultant)
- chief harbor
safety strategist and
operations assistant

5

•
•

•
•

Run port operations and systems
(short- or long-term)
Perform maintenance of vessels
and facilities
Supervise employees
Manage specific functions of port
facilities
Plan efficient use of port resources,
with attention to security, safety,
and health of personnel
Monitor related environmental
regulations
Oversee environmental protection
and other social responsibility
functions.

Monitor and assess hazardous and
unsafe situations
Develop guidelines for personnel
safety

Interviewees mentioned their close collaborations with regional or state
harbor masters and the U.S. Coast Guard (USCG) in preparing for natural
hazard events or during emergency responses. In some cases, harbor
masters are responsible for the safety planning of coastal infrastructure in
a region. The position of the environmental specialist can often times be
outsourced to private consultants. However, this study was limited to
employees of the ports themselves.
Port directors/managers rely on communications with the environmental
specialists, safety planners, or harbor masters and the USCG to stay
informed on natural hazards and other climate and extreme weather
events. Different ports — depending on who the decision-maker(s)
communicate(s) with and the port director’s/manager’s prior experience
with hazards — may respond differently to the same event. (When
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presenting results, references attributed to directors correspond to the
directors/managers decision-maker type.)
Management and governance also vary across the ports. Those without a
port authority are privately owned or managed by a private entity in the
name of the state (Table 2). Also, the number of decision-makers and their
years’ experience can influence a port’s response. These data are also
included in Table 2.
Table 2. Demographics representing participating decision-makers.
Number of participating ports

15/22

Ports with port authority

9/15

Number of interviews

30

Types of decision-makers
Directors and managers

17

Safety planners

8

Environmental specialists

5

<5

7

5 - 10

7

11 - 20

8

> 20

8

Years of experience

Range of experience
Gender of decision-makers
Female
Male

1 - 46 (years)
8/30
22/30

This study is exploratory; researchers were challenged to find willing
respondents to represent the three categories of port directors,
environmental specialists, and safety planners from 15 of the 22 of the
medium- and high-use ports in the North Atlantic. Some port directors
are charged with multiple functions and do not have staff with these
specific titles.

3.3

Development of interview instrument: Semi-structured
interviews
The research team developed open-ended questions to capture the
perceptions of decision-makers in 22 medium- and high-use ports in the
North Atlantic on barriers to adaptation and response strategies.
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Additional questions explored the concept of vulnerability — to determine
if interviewees understood the components of vulnerability (exposure,
sensitivity, and adaptive capacity (McIntosh et al. 2019).
By coding the responses to these interviews, consensus on the perceived
barriers to climate and extreme weather adaptation and recorded
decision-makers’ knowledge of strategies to respond were quantified.
Additionally, the practices and circumstances that are locally relevant
across the studied ports and the variation in the responses across the
different decision-makers can be further analyzed and determined. The
methodology and insights from this study can be applied to other
areas/categories. The results and recommendations from this study can
help address adaptation barriers so that seaports can respond to climate
and extreme weather events.
This study addresses the need to quantify barriers first — as a precursor to
drafting a strategic plan and recommendations to increase the port and the
port community’s ability to adapt to coastal hazards.

3.4

Overview of data collection
The data were collected over 4 months (November 2017 — February 2018).
Decision-makers were identified using the ports’ websites and direct
phone calls. The identified decision-makers received information on the
study, its goals and benefits (Appendix B), and a one-page project
summary description (Appendix C) via email. Electronic communications
were followed up with phone calls.
During the data collection period, 30 port decision-makers from 15 of the
22 ports were interviewed: 22 in person and 8 over the phone.
Respondents answered questions about the barriers to adaptation (e.g.,
“What are some of the challenges to implementing extreme weather
adaptation actions at your port?”) and about the resources or strategies to
help them overcome these (e.g., “What resources would enable you to
overcome these challenges?”) (Appendix D).

3.5

Data analysis methods
3.5.1

Coding of transcripts

A grounded theory (Glaser and Strauss 2017; Charmaz 2006) approach to
identifying port barriers to climate and extreme weather events is an
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iterative process that allows for views and concepts to emerge and be
grouped into unique themes or categories. After the transcription of the
interviews, researchers coded the transcripts line-by-line. These were first
coded for barriers, then for strategies, using the NVivo qualitative data
analysis software package (NVivo 2014) . Reviewing the transcripts1,
researchers identified and classified barriers and strategies for overcoming
the barriers independently and resolved differences where necessary2
following the process laid out by Ekstrom and Moser (2014):
1. Each coder reviews interview transcripts and independently identifies
the following:
a. barriers to adaptation mentioned by respondents
b. strategies mentioned by the decision-makers to overcome them.
2. Each coder develops a classification for each observation.
3. Coders compare the classifications and reconciles where necessary
before coding all the interview transcripts and tallying codes. (This step
adds rigor to the study). Main nodes and secondary nodes for coding
(1) barriers and (2) strategies for overcoming the barriers were
predetermined.
4. Discuss details regarding differences or similarities for the barriers
mentioned across the three categories of decision-makers to answer if
the barriers are seen differently.
5. Frequency is a measure of the number of times that a unique, clearly
distinguishable barrier is mentioned. It is an indicator of the diversity
of unique barriers within a larger class of barriers.
6. Regardless of how often the barrier was mentioned, frequency should
not be interpreted as a direct indication of importance and cannot
reveal how difficult it is to overcome a barrier.
7. Barriers and strategies will be coded and grouped by decision-maker
type (managers/directors, safety planners, environmental specialist)
for further analysis.

Before the interviews, the interview protocol and procedures were approved by the University of
California-Berkeley Human Subjects Committee. The protocol required that interviewees be informed of
the purpose of the study and give written consent to being interviewed and being taped (for
transcription purposes only). Almost all interviews (98 percent) were conducted in person, either at the
informant’s office or in a mutually agreeable location. The remainder was undertaken by phone due to
scheduling constraints or the preference of the interviewee. IRB Approved 894694-8
2 NVivo Coding comparison between coders; in the initial coding phase, yielded a 0.696 Kappa value
(values between 0.40 - 0.75 = fair to good agreement).
1
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3.5.2

Organization of results

The output of the cultural consensus model is presented first. Next are the
identified seven major categories of identified barriers to adaptation
(Figure 3). Each barrier is described and explained, and its sub-categories
are presented and exemplified within the context of the decision-makers’
responses. Next, the strategies to overcome the barriers to adaptation are
presented. These clustered into five major categories of strategies. Each
strategy is described, and its corresponding sub-categories are explained,
with examples from port decision-makers.
3.5.3

Use of Cultural Consensus Model (CCM)

The CCM assumes there is a shared cultural knowledge or a cultural
normative belief in a group. The use of the CCM guides the aggregation of
individual “culturally correct responses” and measures the level of
agreement between individuals (Weller 2007; Romney et al. 1987). A
Pearson correlation coefficient measures the agreement to analyze the
number of subjects and their frequencies.
The use of the CCM guides the aggregation of individual responses to a
series of questions to an estimate of “cultural correct responses,”
measuring the level of competence between individuals as well (Weller
2007). The CCM distinguishes patterns of socially transmitted knowledge
people use to interpret the world to make decisions (Romney et al. 1987).
This can be useful in decision-making for climate and extreme weather
resilience investments.
For example, in a study on “cultural cognition of risk” that looks at climate
change and the use of nuclear energy, researchers identified where
members of the public disagreed on scientific facts surrounding risk
(Kahan et al. 2011). Others have used it to analyze levels of competence
among a group of people (Boster 1989).
The CCM is useful in assessing qualitative data that can be organized into
categories. Researchers can use it to identify barriers and make recommendations for locally relevant constructive interventions to the extreme
weather adaptation process.

18

ERDC/CHL CR-19-??

4

Results and Discussion
In the beginning of this research, two main questions were posed: “What
are some of the challenges to implement extreme weather adaptation?”
and “What resources [or strategies] would enable you to overcome these
challenges?” After interviewing 30 port decision-makers at 15 different
ports in the North Atlantic region, the responses to these questions
resulted in seven major barriers and five major strategies. The frequency
of responses from each decision-makers group for each category of
barriers and strategies is identified in Figures 3 and 5. A total of 17 port
directors, 8 environmental specialists and 5 safety planners participated.
Example quotations and references from the interviews are presented for
the barriers and for the strategies to overcome the barriers1. This section
presents the results of the CCM and then explains each identified barrier
and the context in which it is mentioned (sub-categories).

4.1

A CCM to identify decision-makers’ adaptation barriers
First, respondents’ responses were coded to identify the major barriers as
perceived by respondents. With barriers identified, the CCM analysis was
used with ANTHROPAC 6.46 software (Borgatti 1996) to assess agreement
between different respondents. The CCM measures the ratio of the
variability in the data in the first to second factor loading2 (>3.0). From
the CCM, the respondents’ consensus measures (Table 2) and estimates of
their competence or agreement with the group were derived (Appendix F).
This analysis allows the identification of how subgroups (i.e., port
directors, environmental specialists, safety planners) have common
perceptions around barriers.
With a factor ratio of 3 (i.e., rounding of 2.91), the respondents are said to
be drawn from a single population, meaning that there is agreement in
their responses on the barriers to adaptation. A smaller factor ratio would
indicate that respondents pertain to two or more populations — meaning
1

Some quotations from the interviews have been lightly edited and condensed for clarity purposes.
Verbatim quotations are on file with the researchers.

2

The factor loadings are based on the common variance between the analyzed responses. Each
decision-maker’s response is compared to the responses from all the decision-makers (n = 30). This
process generates a correlation matrix where each column of squared loading factors (e.g.,
eigenvalues) represents the amount of variance accounted for by a factor {NCSU 2018}. Therefore,
factor loading one accounts for the variability in the data, and each succeeding factor loading accounts
for as much of the remaining variability.
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that their views (on climate and extreme weather) are not homogeneous —
having different perceptions of what the barriers to adaptations are. The
competence score represents a measure of their shared knowledge. For the
studied group, the average competence score is 0.598, and the values
range from 0.981 (highest agreement) to 0.067 (low or absence of
agreement) (Table 3). As an example, when two respondents answered
that barrier #1 and barrier #2 were the main challenges, their competence
score could be closer to 1, or 0.981. However, when a third respondent
mentioned barrier #3 to be most important, its competence score could be
closer to 0.598. The full output of the competence model is presented in
Appendix F.
Table 3. CCM analysis: consensus for 30 port decision-makers on the perceived barriers to
climate and extreme weather adaptation. Factor loading one accounts for the variability in the
data; factor loading two accounts for the remaining variability.

Sample (n = 30)

1st
Factor

2nd
Factor

1st to 2nd
Factor Ratio

Average "Competency"

14.282

4.905

2.912

0.598
(St. Dev. 0.25)

By measuring consensus in decision-makers’ responses to the barriers to
adaptation, it is possible to identify the knowledge people use to interpret
the world when making decisions (Romney et al. 1987). Climate change
studies stress how decision-making barriers can slow the development and
implementation of adaptation strategies (Moser and Ekstrom 2010;
Biesbroek et al. 2011). The measurements of the cultural consensus model
provide a signal of the high level of agreement shared by port decisionmakers — an agreement that could facilitate conversations and
collaborations to build port resilience in the North Atlantic region. The
strength of the results on the barriers comes from having found consensus
among the respondents (Table 3, Figure 3). These results can guide plans
and strategies to overcome the barriers.

4.2

Typology of port barriers to adaptation
This analysis revealed seven major categories of perceived barriers to
climate and extreme weather adaptation, as perceived by 30 port
decision-makers in 15 of the 22 medium- and high-use ports in the
North Atlantic. Figure 3 shows the number of respondents that
mentioned at least one barrier from each of the seven categories at least
one time during the interview.
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Figure 3. Seven barriers to climate and extreme weather adaptations resulted from 30
interviews in 15 North Atlantic ports. The value above each color is the percentage of
respondents who mentioned that barrier within the decision-maker type (Directors/Managers,
Environmental Specialists, Safety Planners). Blue numbers are the total frequency of the
responses (n = 30). Blue-outlined sections are the overall percentage of responses for a
barrier (Graph credit: J. Menendez Lopez).

The following section describes the seven categories of barriers. Each has
sub-categories, setting the context in which the barrier was mentioned.
For example, the category lack of understanding of risks has six subcategories. One is confusion over the level of risk, and another is the
difficulty of predicting where impacts will be. Under the sub-category
responses by decision-maker type, some distinct responses and
differences in viewpoints of given groups were highlighted. In parenthesis
the coded number and type for the respondent are noted, as follows: DIR
= port director, ES = Environmental specialist, SP = Safety planner. The
number following the respondent type is the participant’s number; thus,
DIR18 is a port director coded as #18. When decision-makers’ responses
to barriers differed, specific examples are provided.
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While a higher number of port directors identified lack of
understanding and governance disconnect in their responses
about barriers, environmental specialists mentioned physical
constraints of the ports second to the lack of understanding. For
the safety planners — those who deal with port safety daily —
mentioned the lack of funding as frequently as the risks do not
meet an action threshold as their top-two barriers (Figure 3).

4.2.1

Barrier 1 – Lack of understanding of risks

4.2.1.1 Description of Barrier 1
The lack of understanding of risks was mentioned by 28/30 respondents
(Figure 3). This is further explained by the barrier’s sub-categories
(Table 4) which include (1) Confusion over the level of risk, (2) Difficulty
of predicting where the impact will be, (3) Lack of awareness of risk, (4)
Lack of experience with extreme events, (5) Political discord, and (6) Lack
of understanding of unintended consequences. This is a barrier that
typically arises at the beginning of a planning process (Moser and Ekstrom
2010). Understanding that adaptation is a process is key to having rational
decision-making that accounts for understanding the problem, planning
adaptation actions, as well as managing the implementation of their
strategic options (Moser and Ekstrom 2010).
Within the IPCC, addressing uncertainty for decision-makers has surfaced
as an important topic. Social scientists look at adaptation barriers
regarding people’s willingness to act, or their motives and willingness to
act, in the context of decision-making processes (Tompkins et al. 2010;
Biesbroek et al. 2011). These studies find that social factors like attitudes,
values, and ethical beliefs explain how individuals chose to engage in the
adaptation process. Therefore, these social factors present a constraint
that defines people’s adaptive behavior (Biesbroek et al. 2011).
In Table 4, the levels of agreement between the decision-maker categories
are color-coded to denote high agreement to low agreement, as found by
the CCM.
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Table 4. Lack of understanding of risks, and its six sub-categories. Numbers in the rows are
percentages of the total number (n = 30) of the respondents in each decision-maker group
that mentioned a strategy in the category at least one time. Colors denote high agreement
(green), to low agreement (orange), to zero mentions (gray).
Directors
and
Managers

Environmental
Specialists

Safety
Planners

n = 17

n=8

n=5

Confusion over the level of risk

18

25

20

Difficulty of predicting where the impact will be

35

63

60

Lack of awareness of risk

29

38

20

Lack of experience with extreme events

59

38

60

Lack of Understanding Risks (93%)

Political discord
Lack of understanding of unintended
consequences

20
47

63

40

Most sub-category barriers relate to the difficulty in predicting impacts or
if the hazard will occur (Table 4). Many decision-makers felt that severe
weather events in the past (if any) did not predict the future, “. . . The
storm was over 50miles/hours gusts, but we typically dont see a whole lot
of these [level of the storm], and there certainly could be a lot of damage to
the buildings and all the structures . . .” (DIR18)
The respondents also mentioned the difficulty of predicting where the
flooding will be. What is expected to happen may not happen, and what
does happen may demand a different response. In the words of one
decision-maker: “. . . the flooding was coming from the other way . . . it
was coming from a direction people were not expecting it . . .” (ES29)
Respondents described resilience planning as often reactionary and
myopic, with ports engaging in mitigation planning only after a natural
hazard and then preparing to respond to similar hazards in the future
based on the latest experience, rather than to the other plausible events.
As one decision-maker said, “I think that we have done enough . . . to
measure ourselves up against the next Hurricane Sandy . . . But
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unfortunately, the reality is Sandy was not nearly as bad as it could have
been.” (DIR23)
Environmental specialists emphasized the need to conduct regular risk
assessments. One said, “Even if our terminals are resilient, getting goods
and services off the terminal and over the transportation network might
pose challenges if . . . networks are not adequately resilient.” (ES10)
Unintended consequences are defined as post-hazards effects that were
not anticipated. One safety expert’s statement reflected what others had
similarly expressed, “. . . because we got hit with flooding and surge, we . . .
react to flooding and surge . . . there is not really a focus on the other
hazards we are facing.” (SP21)
4.2.1.2 Responses by decision-maker type
Of the five safety planners, four mentioned this barrier. They were the only
ones to cite the lack of understanding of risk in the context of political
discord (Table 4). In the minds of these individuals, the priorities among
politicians are narrow and not necessarily in alignment with climate
adaptation. As one safety officer explained it, “Because of the politics,
actions tend to be a little myopic.” (SP21)
Although advances in science and new scientific models can assist
decision-makers in the understanding of complex problems, the ambiguity
and inherent uncertainty of long-term climate change impacts challenges
the short-term dynamics of the politics in decision-making (Biesbroek et
al. 2013). Respondents in this study felt the difficulty of predicting what
impacts will take place or if a hazard will occur in the future. For them,
better scientific models for predictions of natural hazards are needed to
better understand the inherent uncertainties of climate. In some cases,
respondents cannot recall when the last natural hazard affected them
(Moser and Ekstrom 2010), reducing the urgency to understand and plan
for long-term extreme weather impacts. Hence, understanding the
differences between the long-term impacts of climate change and the
short-term (societal) dynamics makes adaptation planning even more
difficult (Biesbroek et al. 2013).
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4.2.2
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Barrier 2 – Lack of funding

4.2.2.1 Description of Barrier 2
Lack of funding was mentioned by 23/30 respondents (Table 5). This
barrier is defined as the absence of financial resources or the absence of
trained human resources to implement the needed adaptations. There are
three sub-categories within this barrier: (1) Cost of adaptation, (2)
Environmental regulations increase costs, and (3) Lack of funding (in
general terms1) (Table 5). Lack of funding is a dominant obstacle.
Presently, increasing the robustness of infrastructure to withstand more
frequent extreme events is often delayed due to the lack of financial
resources (Eisenack et al. 2014).
Table 5. Lack of funding and its three sub-categories. Numbers in the rows are percentages of
the total number (n = 30) of the respondents in each decision-maker group that mentioned a
strategy in the category at least one time. Colors denote high agreement (green), to low
agreement (orange), to zero mentions (gray).
Directors and
Managers

Environmental
Specialists

Safety
Planners

n = 17

n=8

n=5

Cost of adaptation

24

38

60

Environmental regulations increase costs

6

Lack of funding (in general terms)

59

50

100

Lack of funding (77%)

Port facilities across the United States have old, aging infrastructures that
need ongoing maintenance. Maintenance can be seen as an opportunity to
make improvements that integrate resilience to climate and extreme
weather considerations. However, planning for smarter, long-term
investments in resilience adds to the costs of adaptations.
One director said, “We inherited some old facilities at the port. We are . . .
rehabilitating our main pier . . . built in 1956 . . . [and] beginning to
deteriorate . . .” But, as the words of another director made clear, the
barrier to adaptation “. . . comes down to money.” (DIR25)

1

Sub-categories that include ‘in general terms’ are designated to cluster responses that did not fit in the
other named sub-categories. This was done to avoid creating many distinct sub-categories with only
one sample reference.
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This barrier also related to the need for a change in the [port] agency’s
culture as well as the time investment to plan ahead. Too often, ports “. . .
do not have a planning staff that deals with environmental issues.” (DIR7)
Decision-makers talked about this barrier as it relates to municipal
government’s limited funds and the complexity of retrofitting a port.
Often, state projects do not meet requirements for federal support, which
may favor regional or interstate projects. As one director explained, “If I
were going to build a new bridge that connects two states, that would get
money. If I am looking to elevate a bridge in my state, that probably would
not . . .” (DIR5). This is all the while “. . . municipal governments [funding]
have been trimmed down to the bottom.” (ES30)
This barrier was of concern in the context of the need and cost of
adaptation versus the need for and cost of regular maintenance as “. . . to
implement adaptations, everything is very expensive . . . over a million
dollars.” (SP21)
For old ports and their infrastructure, there is the additional challenge of
keeping up with today’s larger ships and their ability to respond timely to
an imminent weather event. Safety officers explained that while ships are
getting bigger, many old ports’ waterways are narrow. In a significant
weather event, the captain of the port or the USCG may direct the port’s
ships out to sea, but because of the narrow turning basin, “. . . we [captains
of some large ships] may not be able to follow those directions.” (SP16)
4.2.2.2 Responses by decision-maker type
Lack of funding was the second barrier most mentioned by the decisionmakers — 13 directors, 5 environmental specialists, and 5 safety officers.
In Table 5, the levels of agreement are represented by their percentages;
these are the number of mentions per decision-maker category.
Regarding the lack of funding barrier, directors were clear in their
concerns about other sectors that rely on ports and waterways and that are
already challenged by limited funding, “. . . the commercial fishing
industry, with all the regulatory problems that they have, cant bear the
financial burden.” (DIR14)
Respondents spoke of how environmental regulation such as compliance
with the American Disabilities Act (ADA) can increase the costs of the
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needed adaptation, which “is extremely challenging [when space is
limited].” (DIR5)
In this category of barriers, one environmental specialist mentioned the
port’s electrical components’ exposure to climate and extreme weather
events. This included the reference to newer technology not performing
under extreme weather conditions. One environmental specialist noted the
concern that “electrical substations are very low and not elevated
sufficiently . . . they could be elevated, but it is a huge expense.” (ES30)
In other studies, the lack of funding is explained in the context of a
governance void (Hajer 2003), the absence of leadership (Kretsch 2016;
Becker and Kretsch 2019)1, and/or lack of will to invest (Barnett et al.
2013). However, ports need to keep their competitive edge — looking into
the future, the investments of today depended on the investments of the
past (Pechan 2014; Hallegatte 2009; Crabbé and Robin 2006). Port
decision-makers need to understand that financial constraints can become
more of a burden over time as they address shortages in budgets and other
priorities (Ekstrom and Moser 2014).
4.2.3

Barrier 3 – Perceived risks do not exceed an action threshold

4.2.3.1 Description of Barrier 3
Perceived risks do not exceed an action threshold was mentioned as a
barrier by 21/30 respondents (Figure 3). Here, there is an awareness that a
risk exists, but the risk has not exceeded a magnitude or intensity to
prompt an action. These results are in agreement with Barnett et al. (2013)
and link to lack of understanding (barrier #1) as it relates to absence of
will to invest in the unknown (Barnett et al. 2013). These responses not
only highlight the importance of having information to better understand
the risks — prior to an investment but also the importance of having an
informed governance.
This barrier is related to barrier two (a lack of understanding of the risks).
Even when the risks are known, mitigating for them is not necessarily a
priority. There were eight sub-categories in this perceived barrier (Table
6): (1) Perceived risks do not exceed action threshold (in general terms),
1

Becker, A. 2014. Port Cities Preparing for Changing Oceans. Presentation delivered to the Consortium
for Ocean Leadership Council -- Public Forum on the Urban Ocean. Washington, DC.
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(2) Agency culture is not forward thinking, (3) Climate denialism, (4)
Conflicting priorities (e.g., going green versus resilience), (5) Lack of will
to invest in the unknown, (6) Planning for future climate not necessary at
present, (7) Resilience improvements impact business continuity, and (8)
Resilience investments are not a priority.
This barrier was mentioned in the context of ports being unwilling to
invest in the unknown. In the words of one environmental specialist, “It is
a cost-benefit risk management decision to say how much are you willing
to spend for an event that may — or may not ever — take place . . .” (ES22)
Another spoke of the impact on work stream and revenue flow: “. . . it is
hard to, say, raise a terminal by two feet without completely disrupting the
flood of commerce over those terminals.” (ES10)
The sub-category perceived risks do not exceed an action threshold speaks
to the challenge of disruptions and how planning future reconstruction
projects could affect the ability to keep up with operations, given a port
operating at near capacity. Respondents who mentioned this barrier
emphasized that the mission of terminals is to serve their customers,
which means, “. . . get more product in and get it out of the gate.” When
“ports are locally own and operated, they do not [always] have the big
global picture.” (DIR7)
Although respondents indicated that there is a need for adaptation to
natural hazard events, they suggested that priority still is given to other
more immediate tasks related to standard operations, maintenance, and
replacement of equipment. One director explained, “Taking the time and
energy to create planning and think that far ahead . . . is a use of resources.
That is time that could be spent doing something else like addressing
paving concerns, or . . . working to improve labor circumstances or
maintaining equipment.” (DIR17)
4.2.3.2 Responses by decision-maker type
Thirteen directors, three environmental specialists, and five safety
planners mentioned Perceived risks do not exceed an action threshold as a
barrier. In Table 6, the levels of agreement are represented by their
percentages; these are the number of mentions per decision-maker subcategory.

28

ERDC/CHL CR-19-??

29

Table 6. Perceived risks do not exceed an action threshold, and its eight sub-categories.
Numbers in the rows are percentages of the total number (n = 30) of the respondents in each
decision-maker group that mentioned a strategy in the category at least one time. The colors
denote high agreement (green), to low agreement (orange), to zero mentions (gray).
Directors
and
Managers

Environmental
Specialists

Safety
Planners

n = 17

n=8

n=5

Perceived risks do not exceed an action
threshold (in general terms)

12

13

20

Agency culture not forward thinking

6

40

Climate denialism

6

40

Conflicting priorities (going green vs resilience)

6

13

Lack of will to invest in the unknown

6

13

Planning for future climate not necessary at
present

29

Resilience improvements impact business
continuity

18

Resilience investments are not a priority

35

Perceived risks do not exceed an action
threshold (70%)

40

13
60

All safety planners felt this was a barrier (almost double the response
percentage of the other two groups of decision-makers). Safety planners
mentioned it in the context of decision-makers lacking the will to invest in
the unknown and in the difficulty of predicting the future). Such
investment is especially difficult for ports that have little or no experience
with severe storms or flooding events. “We need to change the culture and
start to think . . . forward . . . get in the right mindset of ‘this is . . . real’ . . .
we need to face it.” (SP21)
Another safety expert explained the dilemma of requesting $100,000 to
raise his port’s substation because of SLR, being asked to justify that
expenditure, and getting the response, “Why would I spend money on
something that is predicted versus something that I know that right now
needs to be done?” (SP13)
Environmental specialists mentioned the conflict between green
investments and adaptation investments:
“There are consequences of going green. A number of the
terminals, particularly with their equipment, have moved from
diesel equipment to electric equipment. So now, all the sudden
you got electric motors that are inundated with water . . . in the
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past, if they were diesel or motor engines the impact would have
not been as great. Going green has had an impact on your
resiliency to stormwater damage.” (ES22)
Directors and safety officers perceive that agency culture is not forward
thinking; some of their ideas align with climate denialism: “I am not
convinced that there is climate change” (DIR14), or in mentioning that the
science is not solid and that there are too many contradictions, in the
opinion of a safety planner, “You know, weather fluctuates! I am trained to
look at facts and in some cases statistics and evidence.” (SAF16)
4.2.4

Barrier 4 – Physical constraints limit adaptation options

4.2.4.1 Description of Barrier 4
Twenty of 30 respondents mentioned physical constraints limit options as
a barrier (Figure 3). This is a location-specific factor or a
physical/geographical-specific characteristic that limits the options for the
port’s infrastructure adaptation. There were four sub-categories of this
barrier (Table 7): (1) The complexity of refitting for resilience, (2) Existing
facilities under-designed for present and future conditions, (3) Lack of
practical solutions, and (4) Port is restricted to its current location (it
cannot move).
Most decision-makers are aware that the growth and development of
ports, parallel to coastal development, and the expansion of other sectors
reduce the area that would be needed for climate and extreme weather
adaptations. Aging of the infrastructure, geophysical changes of the coastal
landscapes, and other regulation conditions add to the complexity of this
barrier. These facilities are presently under designed for present day and
future conditions. Other studies explain this physical barrier noting that
because of their placement and their geographical location, ports are
constrained (Adger et al. 2009).
One director said, “We inherited old facilities. The port was built in 1956,
the pier is beginning to deteriorate on the outer shore side . . .” causing
sinkholes on the deck. (DIR1).
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Table 7. Physical constraints limits options and its four sub-categories. Numbers in the rows
are percentages of the total number (n = 30) of the respondents in each decision-maker
group that mentioned a strategy in the category at least one time. Colors denote high
agreement (green), to low agreement (orange), to zero mentions (gray).
Directors
and
Managers

Environmental
Specialists

Safety
Planners

n = 17

n=8

n=5

Complexity of refitting for resilience

24

50

Existing facilities under-designed for
present and future conditions

77

25

20

Lack of practical solutions

18

25

20

Port is restricted to its current location (it
can't move)

29

13

Physical constraints limit options (67%)

Another, referring specifically to container terminals, explained, “. . . any
study is going to [say] that in order to raise the berths, you . . . have to have
an additional strengthening of the structure itself . . .” (ES22). Another
said, “A lot of the infrastructure drainage and so forth . . . wasnt really
originally designed to accommodate what we are seeing and what we will
see in the future.” (ES29)
Respondents also offered reasons why expansion into other nearby areas
often is not possible — simply because of how a coastline is developed. One
director explained that you might think it easy to identify areas along
those rivers, clear them, and make them available for water to flow, but he
said, “Unfortunately, they are all commercially occupied now.” (DIR7)
Retrofitting for resilience becomes even more complex when coupled with
ADA and other regulations. One director said, “How can we do port
adaptation planning and remain compliant with ADA as well? Because of
the transition, the free-board between the vessel and the dock, you have to
accommodate a 20-foot transition for ADA: that is extremely challenging”
(DIR5). Another respondent mentioned the inability to address
navigational hazards such as an old, decommissioned bridge in a New
England waterway for which there was no money for deconstruction
(Figure 4).
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Figure 4. Without funding for deconstruction, a decommissioned bridge becomes a
navigational hazard. (Google Earth image).

4.2.4.2 Responses by decision-maker type
Fourteen directors, four environmental specialists, and two safety
planners mentioned that their port’s physical constraints limit options as a
barrier to adaptation (Figure 3).
The directors and the environmental specialists explained this barrier in
similar terms (Table 7). Refitting ports is a challenge and an opportunity.
It is complex and difficult because of the extensive yard areas that would
need to be elevated and the need for continuous investment. One
environmental specialist noted, “. . . every time you invest, it is an
opportunity to give it [the port/port infrastructure] more lifespan.”
(ES30). “The port could be elevated as we rebuild . . . [but] there is a lot of
things in a container terminal that you also have to do at the same time
when you do that. The barrier is the physical constraints, but there are also
opportunities.” (ES2)
Safety planners mentioned this barrier in the context that the current
facilities are under designed and practical solutions are lacking (Table 7).
“Right here [around the port authority headquarters], the challenge is to
keep the water from coming up into the side. So, if you had that wall in
place but there is precipitation, instead of surge, now you are trapping the
water in” (SP21). As mentioned earlier, another safety officer explained the
difficulty of today’s large ships to turn around within the narrow space of
some older ports’ waterways, especially amid a serious weather event.
(SP16)
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4.2.5
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Barrier 5 – Governance disconnects

4.2.5.1 Description of Barrier 5
Governance disconnect was mentioned by 20/30 respondents (Figure 3).
There are seven sub-categories within this barrier (Table 8): (1)
Complexity of multi-entity planning, (2) Disincentives for resilience
investment (Federal Emergency Management Agency [FEMA]1), (3) Lack
of clarity over who should pay for resilience, (4) Lack of clarity over who
will maintain or control resilience infrastructure, (5) Lack of direction
from above, (6) Political pressure, and (7) Seaports are not prioritized in
large-scale regional planning.
Table 8. Governance disconnect and its seven sub-categories. Numbers in the rows are
percentages of the total number (n = 30) of the respondents in each decision-maker group
that mentioned a strategy in the category at least one time. Colors denote high agreement
(green), to low agreement (orange), to zero mentions (gray).
Directors and
Managers

Environmental
Specialists

Safety
Planners

n = 17

n=8

n=5

Complexity of multi-entity planning

47

63

Disincentives for resilience investment (FEMA)

6

13

Lack of clarity over who should pay for
resilience

12

13

20

Lack of clarity over who will maintain or control
resilience infrastructure

35

13

20

Lack of direction from above

29

50

20

Political pressure

6

13

40

Seaports are not prioritized in large scale
regional planning

24

13

40

Governance disconnect (67%)

Nine of the 15 participating ports in the study had a municipal or regional
port authority. The remaining six were either privately owned or had an
agency acting as a corporate trust on behalf of the port owners.
Governance disconnect relates to the complexity of planning within a
multi-entity organization. This leads to a lack of clarity on who decides on
infrastructure resilience and who controls the investments.
“We recognize extreme weather conditions, but most of the port is
privately owned.” (DIR5). Another director said, “We are not a port
1

This challenge regards the FEMA reconstruction regulations.
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authority, we are a corporation, so we are expected to stand on our own
throughout. We are dependent on the state for our capital expenditures
like [the] two new gantry cranes we just received.” (DIR24)
Environmental specialists and safety planners agreed. “There are multiple
terminals that operate within the port that are private.” (ES12). “Who is
going to pay for adaptations? . . . to control it? . . . to maintain it?” (SP21)
Directors also spoke of the challenges of being a multi-entity organization
where facilities and terminals under the port’s authority had different
landlords and different management frameworks. Respondents often
described the administration of ports as being fragmented. “Long-term
raising of the land would be extremely challenging with how fragmented
everything is down here.” (DIR3). Another said that while having a good
relationship with the private owners of the facility, he wasn’t always aware
of their plans. “I am not aware of … a climate adaptation plan.” (DIR14).
There was also mention of how governance differs port to port. In one
director’s port, his team had little or nothing to do with terminal
operations. “We are here basically just to help with regulatory issues and
try to access resources for infrastructure improvements.” (DIR7)
Collaborations with other agencies were also challenged by whatever was
the focus and priorities of those agencies at a given time. For example,
respondents stated that post disaster, FEMA only compensates for the
costs of bringing the port back up to the required basic standard code. This
gives ports little incentive to elevate their infrastructure beyond the
minimum required, as some respondents mentioned:
FEMA will give you a reimbursement to put a set of offices (like an
office trailer) back where it was, and you dont have to elevate it.
The code may require you to elevate, but FEMA doesnt necessarily
give you any additional compensation beyond what the basic code
requirement is. They will give you additional funding [to meet the
basic code] if you say, ‘I want to elevate it and I have a set of
standards that predicate that I elevate.’ (DIR23)
From a restoration, resiliency issue, the prioritization of being able
to get trade up and operating so that you can open the airport, you
can open the seaports, you can get relief materials so that you can
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get equipment in to start the cleanup—that, from a policy
perspective, has got to change as well. (ES22)
One environmental specialist spoke of this port’s seawall damage in a
previous storm, and because much of the cost of the repairs were made
with FEMA money, the new seawall “could not be rebuilt any higher or
different than what it was when originally constructed.” (ES30)
This barrier was often mentioned in the context of lack of direction from
above. “I think that as the port operators, we are probably not looking to
make those investments.” Asked if the port has a management plan that
considers climate and extreme weather resilience, this environmental
specialist said he was not aware of one. “We haven't been asked to develop
one; so, I don't think that they have one specific for natural hazards.”
(ES2)
4.2.5.2 Responses by decision-maker type
A total of 11 port directors, 6 environmental specialists, and 3 safety
planners mentioned governance disconnect being a barrier (Figure 3). For
directors, this barrier is second in ranking after the lack of understanding
of the risk.
In the subcategories, directors and environmental specialists saw the
complexity of multi-entity planning as a factor.
There is high agreement throughout most of the sub-categories. However,
safety planners did not mention multi-entity planning or the disincentives
of FEMA regulations as a concern. Rather, they highlighted the barrier as
driven by political decisions, “. . . we got to play politics to get the
finances.” (SP26), or they believed a cause was a lack of direction from
above or the result of ports not being prioritized in large-scale regional
planning. “We depleted that money from the Department of Defense to
put it into different programs and now . . . we are flying 50-year-old
planes. So, all [decision on where they will direct the money] is on who
decides to pull the strings at any given time.” (SP16).
Governance disconnect affects adaptation efforts at many levels. Others
describe this disconnect in the context of institutional crowdedness and
institutional void, or in the context of institutional fragmentation
(Ekstrom and Moser 2014); it is also described as governance
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fragmentation (Biesbroek 2011), and institutional governance challenges
(Ekstrom and Moser 2014). This barrier is not singular to climate and
extreme weather adaptation situations but present generally in all types of
governance dealing with a complex problem (Eisenack et al. 2014).
Decision-makers can be informed of many positive benefits and socialeconomic outcomes of implementing needed adaptations, but their
governance will still be constrained by short-term budgetary cycles (Burch
2010) or outdated constructions standards. Respondents mentioned this
limitation: governance disconnect arises when collaborating with other
agencies. FEMA might favor investment on preparation, response, and
recovery for disaster (FEMA 2015) and provide less funding for mitigation
activities (Becker and Caldwell 2015). As an example, after experiencing a
storm or a natural hazard, mitigation was directed towards increasing the
port’s resilience to a similar experienced event. The port could only get
Federal funding to rebuild to the pre-disaster standard or rebuild with
some improvements that integrated updated SLR building codes (FEMA
2015). However, if ports had more funding, they would opt to maximize
the investment by building above the FEMA standards, integrating newer
SLR projections to extend the lifetime of the investment.
Similar to what respondents described as a lack of direction, this barrier is
mentioned in the literature in the context of the lack of clarity of
responsibilities for adaptation at local levels (Ekstrom and Moser 2014;
Huitema et al. 2008; Mukheibir et al. 2013), It can be a political — because
of costs. In some cases, an elected official will defer adaptation because of
the high costs (Vine 2012). Furthermore, governance disconnect is linked
to the absence of leadership and the need for timely decision-making
routines (Burch 2010) when dealing with a system of concern (Moser and
Ekstrom 2010)
4.2.6

Barrier 6 – Lack of communication amongst individuals

Lack of communication amongst individuals was mentioned by only 2/30
respondents (Figure 3). It was mentioned by one director (6%) and one
environmental specialist (13%). In general terms, this barrier relates to
keeping staff and stakeholders informed of changes in climate and weather
events, as well as adaptation strategies, to be prepared and able to sustain
port operations. The director noted, “Communication is always the key,
making sure that our staff is informed about our plans moving forward to
adapt to the changing weather patterns, communicating with the captains
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of the vessels.” (DIR1). The environmental specialist saw recent
improvements in communications but added, “But, that [communications]
can definitely be an issue from time to time.” (ES12)
Biesbroek et al. (2011) also identified lack of awareness and
communication as a barrier to climate change adaptations. Lack of
awareness, or media misinformation, negatively influenced needed public
and government support for climate adaptation (Biesbroek et al. 2011). As
an example, news regarding errors in the IPCC report, in 2013, negatively
influenced opinions surrounding climate change (Leiserowitz et al. 2013)
generating skepticisms and mistrust. Communication, between science,
policy, and the public, is vital to increasing general awareness about
potential impacts of climate change (Moser 2010; Biesbroek et al. 2011).
4.2.7

Barrier 7 – The problem is overwhelming

The problem is overwhelming was also mentioned by only 2/30
respondents (Figure 3): one director (6%) and one environmental
specialist (13%). This barrier relates to the enormity of the climate change
problem and humans’ inability to reverse course on global warming. It also
relates to the realization that regardless how much the port prepares, it
will always be vulnerable. “The electrical component is of concern, we have
substations that are very low elevated. There are two major sub stations
for this area that are below 15 feet in elevation. Now, they could be
hardened, they could be elevated, but it is a huge expense. . . I think that
the electrical grid is a concern” (ES30).
… you cannot control mother nature, the severity of it. For a
hurricane to come through, there is only so much you can do.
You are never going to come out of it unscathed. So, obviously,
there are challenges with all that. Although you can prepare, . . .
you are always vulnerable at some of these extreme weather
changes. (DIR25)

4.3

Strategies to overcome decision-making barriers
In addition to identifying the common barriers to decision-making as
perceived by the port respondents, interviews also asked questions about
how the barriers might be overcome. Analysis of interview transcripts
shows five main strategies for helping decision-makers overcome barriers
to adaptation: (1) Foster collaborations, (2) Make regulatory changes, (3)
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Conduct risk assessment, (4) Develop financial incentives, and (5) Use
new technology to enhance communication network. In Figure 5, the
resulting frequency measures correspond to the total count that
respondents mentioned the strategy in the interview transcript. The
percentages are calculated for the number of responses within each
category of decision-maker.
Figure 5. Decision-makers’ perceptions on the strategies that can help them overcome the
identified barriers to adaptation. The value above each color is the percentage of respondents
that mentioned that strategy within the decision-maker category (Directors/Managers,
Environmental Specialists, Safety Planners). Red numbers are the total frequency of the
responses (n = 30). Red-outlined sections represents the overall percentage of responses for
a barrier. (Graph credit: J. Menendez Lopez).

4.3.1

Strategy 1 – Foster collaborations

4.3.1.1 Description of Strategy 1
Twenty-two of thirty respondents mentioned the foster collaborations
strategy (Figure 5). Strategies coded in this category related to the
promotion or encouragement of partnerships, as well as promoting public
engagement. Six sub-categories were clustered within this strategy, as
follows: (1) Foster collaborations (in general terms), (2) Education
opportunities to understand risk, (3) Form public-private partnerships to
pay for improvements, (4) Partner with academic groups to research
adaptation, (5) Form a resilience working group, and (6) Develop risk
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assessment or include risk and adaptation plans in port’s master plans
(Table 9).
Most port decision-makers favored fostering collaborations as a
strategy to remove the barriers. Through collaborations with
academics, port decision-makers could reduce uncertainty by
gaining knowledge of scholarly works on the range of negative
impacts on social-environmental systems and the increasing risk
to storm impacts in coastal areas due to climate change (USDOT
2013; Hallegatte et al. 2013)
Table 9. Foster collaborations and its six sub-categories. Numbers in the rows are
percentages of the total number (n = 30) of the respondents in each decision-maker group
that mentioned a strategy in the category at least one time. Colors denote high agreement
(green), to low agreement (orange), to zero mentions (gray).
Foster collaborations (73%)

Directors and
Managers

Environmental
Specialists

Safety
Planners

n = 17

n=8

n=5

Foster collaborations (in general terms)

12

Education opportunities to understand risk

18

38

Form public-private partnerships to pay for
improvements

41

50

40

Partner with academic groups to research
adaptation

41

25

20

Form a resilience working group

12

38

40

Developing risk assessment or include risk
and adaptation plans in port’s master plans

24

63

40

Social scientists have highlighted the importance of collaborations in
promoting “strategic thinking, resourcefulness, creativity and effective
communication” (Moser and Ekstrom 2010; page 22,030). In the context
of responding to storms and natural hazards, many ports already
collaborate with state emergency response and management entities,
federal emergency management agencies, the USCG, the Department of
Transportation, as well as the Department of Homeland Security.
Respondents mentioned that they benefit from these collaborations and
from accessing locally relevant information, both of which inform their
resilience planning. “We will participate with anybody who wants to do
anything on the climate resilience topic. We have participated with the
Department of Homeland Security on critical infrastructures assessment,
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and I think that that helped us understand our own infrastructure better.”
(ES30)
Promoting education opportunities that help individuals and groups
understand the risk and knowing how that information needs to be
communicated—different individuals may need different information, and
have it explained in different ways— is very important, as noted by several
respondents:
Creating a clearinghouse of the multiple views of climate change
and climate resilience can be very powerful . . . some folks are
comfortable on a planimetric view and will be able to see the
scope and scale of the impact. Others are going to need to see it
in sections. Not everybody has the facility to understand all
graphic forms and some just need the information in table and
narrative form. (ES30)
We have a set of protocols that we developed last year after a
flooding event . . . a rain event. With the new protocol, we do a
better job at watching the weather, changes in the tide, then
communicating inter-departmentally and giving notice to the
public when we know that there is going to be an event. (ES30)
Respondents also shared how public-private partnerships help them
contribute to the sustainability of other sectors.
One of the things that we are doing in our pier rehabilitation
project, because we have an aquaculture facility just to the north
of our pier, we are working with the owners of that aquaculture
farm and we are probably going to relocate them—at our
expense—to make sure that they can continue to harvest clams
of the bay … and keep their business alive and to keep people
working so that there is no harm to the environment, while we
do our construction, and then we will move them back. (DIR1)
Having learned from experience, some respondents mentioned
collaborations around short-term actions that sustain regular operations
or address SLR. The short-term actions included (1) implementing best
management practices and procedures, (2) doing pier rehabilitation, (3)
raising the pier, (4) conducting flood mitigation projects, and (4)
conducting assessments of critical infrastructure. With the presence of
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port resiliency groups and the integration of their new risk assessments
into their master plans, some respondents reported that they are making
progress in their climate and extreme weather planning:
The city planning department did recently [complete] a hazard
mitigation plan. This was adopted in 2016. It is not fully
developed yet. In this plan, they identified some of the issues
and worked with the Public Works department, the engineer’s
office, the water pollution control agencies. (DIR7)
Current strategies in collaboration with the USCG focus on preparing the
port prior to an imminent storm, as respondents mentioned:
We got a really good maritime team in the region that is
overseen by the USCG. They take the lead on preparations for an
imminent storm. They have pulled all the players in and they
have really brought an awareness, so that we are all thinking
about being prepared all the time. (DIR14)
I think what we are doing well now to increase the port’s
resilience to storms is the planning, and it is the training and the
drilling we do to ensure that boat operators understand the
processes. With the training and mock preparations [across
terminals, departments and port operators], [we] are also able
to make any corrective actions. (SP6)
4.3.1.2 Responses by decision-maker type
There was high agreement about strategies in the category of fostering
collaborations. A total of 23/30 respondents mentioned it (12 directors, 7
environmental specialists, and 4 safety planners). The one difference in
responses was on how collaborations could promote education
opportunities to help port staff understand potential risk. This was
mentioned by directors and environmental specialists but not by safety
planners.
Together with collaborative approaches, a government approach is needed
so that adaptation efforts are facilitated and supported at the state and
national levels (Mukheibir et al. 2013).This process would benefit
governments being empowered, establishing better communication flow,
and transfer of information. Studies also suggest that adaptation efforts
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benefit from stakeholder engagement and participation (Wilbanks and
Kates 1999; Eakin and Luers 2006).
In the North Atlantic region, there are many examples of collaborative
efforts (Becker and Caldwell 2015). Brown University and the University of
Rhode Island are institutions conducting research around the Port of
Providence along with the University of Rhode Island’s Coastal Resources
Center (Becker and Caldwell 2015). At a larger scale is the Infrastructure
and Climate Network in New England, which brings together practitioners
and scientists from multidisciplinary fields. This comprehensive regional
collaboration integrates multiple sectors of the transportation system,
including ports.
4.3.2

Strategy 2 – Make regulatory changes to encourage resilience

4.3.2.1 Description of Strategy 2
The strategy to make regulatory changes to encourage resilience was
mentioned by 20/30 respondents (Figure 5). This strategy calls for the
creation, or enforcement, of legal framework that would support or
pressure port decision-makers to adapt ports to climate and extreme
weather events. There were three sub-categories mentioned: (1) Develop
guidance (from USCG), (2) Regulations force resilience measures, and (3)
Renovation and upgrades integrate SLR considerations (Table 10).
Table 10. Make regulatory changes to encourage resilience, and its three sub-categories.
Numbers in the rows are percentages of the total number (n = 30) of the respondents in each
decision-maker group that mentioned a strategy in the category at least one time. Colors
denote high agreement (green), to low agreement (orange), to zero mentions (gray).
Directors
and
Managers

Environmental
Specialists

Safety
Planners

n = 17

n=8

n=5

Develop guidance (from USCG)

47

25

Regulations force resilience measures

24

38

Renovation and updates integrate SLR
considerations

6

50

Make regulatory changes to encourage
resilience (67%)

20

Regulatory changes are to be long term in their scope. Because of this,
respondents suggested that they be based on the best available data (i.e.,
scientific projections about the potential of SLR, storms, etc.). This
strategy was mentioned in the context of the development of a 30-year
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long-term master plan and the ports’ continued collaboration with USCG
guidance and updates on the technology that generates weather-related
data. One example is the following:
This [response to a storm or weather impact] is really a whole of
community approach. When there is a big storm, a hurricane
tracking, or what is predicted to be a very strong northeastern, the
USCG captain of the port will get all the major stakeholders
together. This includes the US Navy, and our folks on the
operations and the emergency operations side. This also includes
the boat pilots, some of the major consumers and users of the
waterfront. They will all get together and . . . set different
conditions within the port. This is a very prescriptive USCG kind of
thing. (DIR11)
Another example is the following:
Typically, both the state and city need to be involved in resilience
investments said one respondent, explaining that “. . . to make
those resilience investments, it might just have to be driven . . .
the state and the city [need] to start to consider these
adaptations.” (ES2).
4.3.2.2 Responses by decision-maker type
A total of 12 directors, 7 environmental specialists, and 1 safety planner
mentioned make regulatory changes to encourage a resilience strategy
(Figure 5). The only distinction in their responses was that both the
directors and the environmental specialists mentioned this in the context
of developing guidance from the USCG and regulatory changes, while the
safety planner’s response focused on how adaptation could be addressed
by factoring in SLR when renovating facilities in the future: “Youll see as
facilities are renovated or new facilities are constructed, that they will
factor in SLR.” (SP6)
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Environmental specialists and safety planners favored regulatory
changes as a needed strategy for adaptation (Figure 5). The role of
governance – responsible actors that are actively engaged cannot
be underestimated. In the absence of active leadership in port
resilience efforts, regulatory changes that align with a resilience
mandate could influence the allocation of resources to both
safeguard the port and serve the surrounding areas and
communities.

4.3.3

Strategy 3 – Conduct risk assessments

4.3.3.1 Description of Strategy 3
Conduct risk assessments as a strategy to overcome barriers to adaptation
was mentioned by 17/30 respondents (Figure 5). The strategy is defined as
the action of documenting, and acknowledging, the risk factors at a port —
a fundamental step in understanding the vulnerability of a port and its
facilities.
There are three sub-categories within this barrier: (1) Learn from
experiences, (2) Train for emergency response, and (3) Undertake holistic
risk assessments (Table 11).
Table 11. Conduct risk assessments, and its three sub-categories. Numbers in the rows are
percentages of the total number (n = 30) of the respondents in each decision-maker group
that mentioned a strategy in the category at least one time. Colors denote high agreement
(green), to low agreement (orange), to zero mentions (gray).
Directors
and
Managers

Environmental
Specialists

Safety
Planners

n = 17

n=8

n=5

Learn from experience with storms

47

63

60

Train for emergency response

6

25

Undertake Holistic Risk Assessment

6

75

Conduct risk assessment (57%)

40

Having learned from the recent passing of Hurricane Sandy (2012)
(Appendix G), some respondents indicated that they are making resiliency
upgrades. Comments from directors include “You know, it was short term,
but think and extrapolate that SLR projection to a longer-term period and
you would have flooded terminals on a frequent basis. [That frequency of]
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flooding . . . would interrupt the free flow of goods regularly” (DIR11). “To
address SLR, the only thing I can think of is taking the current port
management plan that we have and try to adapt it based on [the need for]
higher grounds” (DIR3). Other directors and safety planners had similar
comments:
Our city has a dedicated marine unit in the police department and
the fire department also owns vessels that they use to train on a
regular basis. They have docks so that they can put out fires on
vessels or on shoreline infrastructure. There is also a diving team
that trains regularly for search and rescue . . . (DIR5).
. . . the port has done some assessments and they are
incorporating it [information from the assessments] into longterm planning . . . We did an assessment for the port and there
was a location where they wanted to put an IT [information
technology] backup. They wanted to use a small building, and
when they realized that that could flood just a little bit, they
decided to move it elsewhere . . . (SP6)
The port is trying to avoid … an unexpected occurrence that
causes the shutdown of operations in the middle of the day and
results in a logistics nightmare. The goal is . . . to eliminate the
disruption or the potential for the disruption. (SP6)
A port’s facilities, warehouses, and even their stormwater management
systems are candidates for impact, as one director says, “If we had a storm
like Sandy, I would fear the warehouse would be impacted at its current
elevation level” (DIR4). Another spoke in more detail about what his port
is doing:
Part of the projects that we are working on—we are handling some
stormwater management upgrades on our docks, on our wharfs—
we are getting CDS [Continuous Deflective Separation] units,
which handle floatables, and we are also rebuilding our wharves
to handle surges/flood issues. So, we have been working on that
and we have been incorporating the thought process [on SLR risk
and how to prepare for them] into our projects as we move
forward. (DIR4)
Some port decision-makers mentioned the importance of training in
emergency response and conducting drills on the deployment of
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protecting-devices such as “. . . aqua-fans devices and armor[ing] certain
facilities and buildings with them” as early actions to protect against those
things that could happen immediately (DIR28). “Since super-storm Sandy,
we . . . purchased the aqua fences, all ready to be deployed around
substations, transformer facilities and [have taken] other measures both in
the port and at the airport” (DIR28).
Another spoke of the need to ensure the individuals procuring new
resilient equipment or designing more resilient facilities know what is
needed and they “understand what it needs to have to make it resilient and
to make it conform with the long-term viability [of the port]” (DIR11).
4.3.3.2 Responses by decision-maker type
Eight directors, six environmental specialists, and three safety planners
mentioned conducting risk assessments as a strategy (Figure 5). The
environmental specialist and the safety officers put a higher emphasis on
this strategy than did directors, highlighting lessons learned from
Hurricane Sandy (2012) and the need to not only focus on a similar impact
but to undertake a more holistic risk assessment. Of all the responses,
environmental specialists were more systematic in their approach to
understanding resilience. They integrated concepts from engineering,
mentioned the use of three-prong approach, and highlighted the need for
more data to run risk models and cost-benefit analysis. The three-prong
approach includes (1) wherever possible, relocate non-essential activity
out of the flood plain; (2) if that was not possible, commit to elevate
structures and sensitive infrastructure two feet above the hundred year
flood plain for their basin; and (3) if that is not possible, then make sure
that moving forward, new upgrades were better, and used non-corrosive,
stronger materials that can hold up to extreme weather.
Having information is important, one respondent mentioned, “I think,
from a planning perspective, it would be helpful to have more information
to run the models on risk and cost-benefit based on risk” (ES10). “We just
did finish a resiliency study . . . and it was looking at some of the hard
infrastructure and potential issues we could have here for tidal surge and
flooding. (ES12). Another environmental specialist spoke about how
conducting risk assessments helped them better understanding the risk:
The potential for impact has been presented to leadership in the
city’s staff, and we now have a better idea of how to talk about
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adaptation . . . Taking a three-pronged approach at a concept
level, we now have a better understanding of the engineering and
what we need to do; we have a better understanding of what the
impacts will be; and we are more conversant in the process.
(ES30)
4.3.4

Strategy 4 – Develop financial incentives

4.3.4.1 Description of Strategy 4
Development of financial incentives was mentioned by 15/30
respondents as a strategy (Figure 5). These included eight port directors,
six environmental specialists and one safety officer. Respondents in this
study perceived that financial incentives could facilitate needed
adaptations at the port. The political nature of local government means
that all decisions, including climate adaptation, are affected by political
interests and competing preferences vying for support at the municipal
scale (Keen et al. 2006).
Because port resources are generally used for standard maintenance and
day-to-day operations, it is easier to persuade tenants and others that
adaptation is worthwhile if there are also financial incentives for making
adaption(s). Incentives can come from grants or federal or state
government agencies. One director felt “The only way that we have been
able to achieve that [adaptation] is through getting funding through the
federal government” (DIR18).
Incentives can come also from insurance companies — in the form of
reduced insurance premiums tied to a port’s increased resilience to
hazards, as described by two respondents:
Financial incentive is always an easy driver for a lot of the tenants
and people within agencies . . . to convince them that [adaptation
measures] are worthwhile . . . tenants come to us requesting what
guidelines they should follow, since they are working and
operating on our facilities . . . I have prescribed to them that they
discuss [with their insurance provider] whatever requirements are
pertinent . . . a lot of times the cost saving can be dramatic, even
just by going up . . . half a foot more in elevation. (DIR23)
[We need] more financial [incentives] and it would have to be from
a State or federal level. (DIR3)
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4.3.4.2 Responses by decision-maker type
Eight directors, six environmental specialists, and one safety planner
mentioned the development of financial incentives as a strategy to remove
the barriers to adaptation. Safety planners summarized this in just two
words, “money and resources,” what they considered most needed for
adaptation (SP13).
4.3.5
Strategy 5 – Use new technology to enhance communication
networks
4.3.5.1 Description of Strategy 5
The use of new technology to enhance communication networks was
mentioned by 6/30 respondents (Figure 5). These included four port
directors and two environmental specialists. This strategy refers to
enhancing available information through the acquisition of real-time data
or using available models to project weather in advance. For instance, the
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), the U.S.
Geological Services, and other agencies provide real-time local weather
data or modeled projections that increase port decision-makers’ ability to
predict in advance and prepare for a given weather condition.
Twenty-four percent of the directors and managers mentioned using new
technology to enhance communication networks as a strategy to remove
barriers to adaptation. For example, one director stated, to the important
role of federal agencies, “We get a lot of information from NOAA, different
sorts of agencies that monitor buoys and collect data along the coastline,
and . . . that data are aggregated into information that they can provide for
us” (DIR 18). Another director elaborated with the following:
We have NOAA PORTS1 program; it is the physical oceanographic
real-time system. Basically, we got sensors out there, available to
the public on the internet, to tell you the exact state of the tides,
and we have a sensor on the . . . bridge that will tell you the exact
distance from the bottom of the bridge to the water on that bridge.
(DIR8)

1

This is a NOAA initiative program, Physical Oceanographic Real Time System (PORTS). For more
information, go to https://oceanservice.noaa.gov/facts/ports.html.
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Because we keep track of the weather . . . several times a day . . . we
know a storm is threatening, we take precautions. (DIR9)
Twenty-five percent of the environmental specialists mentioned using new
technology as a strategy to remove barriers to adaptation. They mentioned
using data networks to inform goals and decision-making. In one of the
ports, the emergency response is orchestrated through a marine instant
response team that coordinates different sides of port operations and port
safety personnel, connecting with agencies both outside and inside of the
port. Several environmental specialists spoke on this issue:
We are a team of folks, and we have a marine instant response
team on the terminal that coordinates with our safety folks and
operations folks. I get involved from time to time as well. Our
development coordinator gets involved . . . Basically, you have
some representatives there from each terminal, representing each
department for the most part. Then they coordinate with outside
entities like the USCG or the Department of Emergency
Management (DEM) at the state level. (ES 12)
4.3.5.2 Responses by decision-maker type
Decision-makers in this study mentioned different short-term actions that
were being implemented to increase the resilience of their ports to natural
hazards. Some of these included implementing best management practices
and procedures and updating port management plans to include risk
assessments or putting in place a Risk Assessment of Critical
Infrastructure document. Environmental specialists also saw the potential
in ports to become greener and more sustainable, playing their part in
being supportive of green industries. As an example, ports are taking steps
to reduce their carbon footprint by encouraging the acquisition of new
trucks. Some ports are capitalizing on the transportation of wind turbine
equipment, and there was mention of leveraging the port’s building space
for solar power industries. One environmental specialist mentioned how
using the port infrastructure as a resource could potentially help them
finance climate and extreme weather adaptation.
Other short-term actions include implementing pier rehabilitation
projects, raising the pier to FEMA standards (or above when resources are
available), and conducting flood mitigation projects. To address
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adaptation, the strategies to assist port decision-makers in removing or
managing the existing barriers were assessed.
The results of this study represent a subset of decision-makers for 15
medium-use and high-use ports in the North Atlantic. Responses on
climate and extreme weather adaptation barriers and strategies need to
consider the location and geographical conditions as relates to the natural
hazards that ports are experiencing. More work is needed to integrate a
larger number of port stakeholders in the conversation, to make clear
connections not only on what the barriers are but also on who has the
responsibility to remove them (Biesbroek et al. 2013). Efforts should
expand to understand risk both at the port and their neighboring
communities. The development of the approach and research methods
used in this study can be used in other regions to measure consensus on
barriers to adaptation and the strategies.
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5

Recommendations
As more studies address processes and challenges of implementing climate
and extreme weather adaptation, the imperative to understand barriers at
the port level is still fairly new. This study addresses the need to quantify
barriers to understand the ability of ports, and communities, to adapt to a
threat of coastal hazards. Earlier sections summarized port decisionmaker perceptions of the barriers to climate and extreme weather
adaptation and their opinions on strategies to help overcome these. This
section reflects on some of those results and provides recommendations to
help decision-makers address adaptation barriers.
Although barriers to adaptation will always exist, the magnitude of
damages in the coasts and critical infrastructure can be reduced through
the implementation of climate and extreme weather adaptations (Füssel
2007). Hence, U.S. port operators, who hold the primary responsibility for
resilience planning (Becker and Caldwell 2015), can minimize the port’s
vulnerability to natural hazards by implementing adaptation strategies
(Nicholls et al. 2008).
The presence of adaptation barriers in the decision-making process is not
unexpected. However, barriers, especially those that are social in their
nature, can be overcome through political will (Adger et al. 2008), through
support, resources, and effort (Moser and Ekstrom 2010). In the past, as
ports developed and built their infrastructures, decision-makers used
probabilities and projections known to them and invested in technologies
and energy sources that were available then. With current changes in
climate and extreme weather events, the uncertainty of these events
increases the risks and vulnerability of ports, coastal infrastructures and
their communities.
This study specifically addresses port decision-makers’ barriers to
adaptation because decision-makers play a significant role in reducing
risks and building the resilience of their ports. Port decision-makers
already know that failure to implement climate and extreme weather
adaptation would result in the following:
•
•

ports being vulnerable to floods, wind impacts, more severe storms,
etc.
loss of business due to shutdowns
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•

loss of connections to other infrastructure (i.e., roads, rail).

By participating in addressing barriers to adaptation and seeking to
understand the risks and the benefits of adaptation, the three decisionmaker categories directors, environmental specialists and safety planners
can enhance the resilience of their ports. In the recommendations that
follow, the concerns that the decision-makers highlighted (Figure 3) are
matched with some of their identified strategies (Figure 5) and adaptation
approaches identified in the literature. Often times, addressing one
adaptation barrier will overlap with solving for other barriers.
To address the barriers of lack of understanding of the risks and
governance disconnect, port decision-makers could (1) institutionalize
climate and extreme weather adaptations, (2) conduct risks and
environmental assessments, and (3) foster collaborations.

5.1

Institutionalize climate and extreme weather adaptations
Institutionalizing adaptations generally means including such strategies in
management plans, along with strategic plans and budgets to allocate
resources for adaptation and mitigation (Zambrano-Barragán et al. 2010).
These two barriers of concern are best addressed by making regulatory
changes, changes that require stable local leadership (Ekstrom and Moser
2014), and support from higher levels of governance (Rudberg et al. 2012),
as well as establishing an institutional framework to address adaptation on
an ongoing basis.
One of the most important steps a government can take to prepare for
present and future extreme weather events is “the inclusion of adaptation
and mitigation in annual operative plans and budget allocations”
(Zambrano-Barragán et al. 2010; page 1). Climate adaptation will always
be affected by political interest contesting for support from municipalities
(Keen et al. 2006) because regulatory change strategies are most often
long term in their scope, and political agendas are short term in their
scope, the inherent uncertainty of climate projections makes this difficult
(Stocker 2013).
The role of port directors, their leadership and direction in the processes
of adaptation, is critical to the reduction of risks at the port level. In the
absence of an appointed state individual who oversees climate and
extreme weather actions, port directors can (1) appoint individual(s) that
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can lead and coordinate climate and extreme weather adaptation in their
ports and (2) together, the director, the appointed individual(s) — or a
committee — can draft a framework for the planning and inclusion of
other port stakeholders. These steps would serve to outline collaborations
and links to information on national weather, availability of funds and
opportunities, and research collaborations.
Zambrano-Barragán et al. (2010) stated that to address the adaptation
barriers, strategies should include the development of flexible social
institutional frameworks as a basis for decision-making, and the
development of policies that are based on experience, that are relevant to
many possible future scenarios, as well as be informed of numerous
factors affecting societal change (Rayner and Malone 1998; Sarewitz and
Byerly 2000). An inspired leadership, Burch writes, could significantly
change the context of decision-making by establishing innovative
governance models (Burch 2010).
Institutionalizing climate and extreme weather adaptations also addresses
decision-makers concerns for lack of funding and physical constraints,
given that mitigation and adaptation would be included in annual budgets.
Although this pilot study does not investigate or present current policies
on climate and extreme weather adaptation for ports, the understanding
and characterization of barriers need to be seen in the context of available
policy options (Lempert et al. 2004) and in the context of societal changes
(Rayner and Malone 1998; Sarewitz and Byerly 2000). Making regulatory
changes was recorded as the second (20/30 frequency in responses; Figure
5) strategy to overcome adaptation barriers. This strategy was of great
importance to environmental specialists who see the port within a system
that is interconnected with the environment.
It is noted in the literature that decision-makers often consider and adopt
adaptation strategies that are in alignment with their own values and
political interests. Decision-making is influenced by “how people perceive,
interpret, and think about risks and their management, what information
and knowledge they value,” etc. (Moser and Ekstrom 2010; page 22,029).
To decrease the lack of understanding, increase communication and
address why the perceptions of risk do not exceed an action threshold
decision-makers could do the following:
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•
•

5.2

Conduct risk and environmental assessments
Foster collaborations.

Conduct risks and environmental assessments
Port environmental specialists and safety planners would have a
role to play in the development of ongoing risks and environmental
management plans. Environmental specialists, in this study, highlighted
lack of understanding of risks and physical constraints as the top barriers
of concerns. Safety officers mentioned that perceived risks did not meet an
action threshold and the lack of funding as the barriers of most concern to
them. All decision-makers saw opportunities and benefits for establishing
collaborations and partnerships with researchers and people in
government agencies who could help them increase their understanding of
climate change and extreme weather impacts, as well as elaborating risk
management plans for their ports that integrate data from government
sources. As Biesbroek et al. (2011) identified earlier, there is great need for
public and government support in climate adaptations.
Safety planners in this study — perhaps — being more cognizant of risk
conditions at their ports, rather than highlighting the need for conducting
risk assessments, most frequently mentioned fostering collaborations and
making regulatory changes as strategies to overcome adaptation barriers.
Fankhauser et al. (1999) mentioned that decision-making processes that
provide the right information, resources, and skills to people can increase
their resilience and ability to adapt to climate change in a reliable manner.
Collaborative research and information gathering can provide guidance
that is key to decision-making process under uncertainty (ZambranoBarragán et al. 2010). Some climate-related information like
meteorological data, models, and predictions, together with historical,
geographical, and socio-economic information, are central for adaptation
processes (McGray et al. 2007).
While it may be impossible to eradicate uncertainty, the acquisition of
knowledge could turn reactive responses into proactive planning. Through
a better understanding of weather trends and frequency probabilities,
decision-makers can respond to storm events by delivering effective
strategies that reduce risks and respond to present and future climate and
extreme weather changes in an informed manner.
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5.3

Foster collaborations
To foster collaborations and establish partnerships are the base of
decision-making for climate and extreme weather adaptation (present and
future). Aside from mentioned collaborations with academics and
government agencies, decision-makers benefit from the guidance and
feedback from policy makers and insurance providers. One of the greatest
advantages of collaborations is the shared burden of plans and actions,
where resources, time investments, and expertise can be shared
(Zambrano-Barragán et al. 2010).
Reaching out to others, port decision-makers can learn to maximize future
investments and become aware of best available data that enable them to
make informed decisions. This can be instrumental for the development
and implementation of resilient strategies that are effective in reducing
risks of ports to climate and extreme weather impacts. There will be port
administrations and decision-makers that have not yet experienced an
extreme event. Furthermore, public engagement brings stakeholders to the
forefront. Stakeholders’ involvement in participatory forums and
programs is key to early identifying local concerns. Participatory processes
strengthen the social and political base for effective implementation of
policies and decisions that consider general priorities of all, the shortterm, long-term responses and tradeoffs of the decision-making processes
(Zambrano-Barragán et al. 2010).
Conducting risk and environmental assessments are closely intertwined
with fostering collaborations and partnerships because of shared interests.
Through these collaborations there is an opportunity for technology and
innovation, the use and development of existing tools, and strategies and
mechanisms to enhance operations and communication. An increase in
the institutional capacity and the knowledge of potential risks paves the
way for planning strategically; addressing concerns and infrastructures
vulnerabilities on a regular basis would make the problem of climate and
extreme weather impacts less overwhelming.
Because decision-making itself can be a barrier to adapting to climate and
extreme weather, decision-makers play a significant role in reducing risk
and building the resilience of their ports. As noted by the National
Research Council (NRC), effective adaptations for climate change need all
types of decision-makers and stakeholders to participate (NRC 2010).
Increasing institutional capacity in the ports can promote the
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advancement of informed decision-making guidance and knowledge
needed to execute on adaptation planning and risk management. In the
table below, additional recommendation actions are outlined for each
different decision-maker type (Table 12).
Table 12. Other recommended actions that port decision-makers can take in function of their
positions at the ports.
Port Directors and Managers

Environmental Specialists Safety Planners

(1) Work with regulatory agencies
to develop regulatory changes that
encourage resilience and provide
financial incentives.

(1) Integrate climate risk (1) Integrate climate risk
assessments into the port assessment into the port
management plan.
management plan.

(2) Lead managers, port operators,
and others in organizing and
establishing working groups and
developing emergency response
strategies (flood barriers, etc.)

(2) Organize working
(2) Organize working
groups to address climate groups to address climate
risk.
risk.

(3) Promote learning opportunities,
acquisition of data, and
communication tools to enhance
understanding of risks.

(3) Organize drill exercises
to enhance the ability of
port personnel to respond
to natural disasters.

(4) Direct working groups to update
port master plans to include
relevant SLR projections and/or to
develop risk assessments.

An incremental approach to adaptation strategies can be thought of as
“extensions of actions and behaviors that already reduce the losses that
can enhance the benefits of natural variations in climate and extreme
events” (Kates et al. 2001). Directors, environmental specialists, and safety
planners, together with port administrators and a growing number of
informed stakeholders, in time and with practice, can achieve a balance in
the implementation of the adaptation processes, understanding the
barriers, evaluating possible strategies, and carrying out their
implementation and evaluation.
The contribution of this research builds and integrates knowledge on port
decision-makers’ barriers to adaptation and strategies to help them
remove these. The results of this study represent a subset of decisionmakers for 15 medium-use and high-use ports in the North Atlantic.
Responses on climate and extreme weather adaptation barriers and
strategies need to consider the location and geographical conditions as
relates to the natural hazards that ports are experiencing. More work is
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needed to integrate a larger number of port stakeholders in the
conversation, to make clear connections not only on what the barriers are
but also on who has the responsibility to remove them (Biesbroek et al.
2013). Efforts should expand to understand risks at the port and their
neighboring communities. The development of the approach and research
methods used in this study can be used in other regions to measure
consensus on barriers to adaptation and the strategies.
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Conclusions
The results of this pilot study suggest that North Atlantic medium- and
high-use port decision-makers’ perceived barriers to climate and extreme
weather adaptation fall into seven categories, and their proposed
strategies to address fall into five categories. The 30 interviewed port
decision-makers have consensus on the barriers that prevent them from
implementing resilient adaptations. This shared agreement is fundamental
for the understanding of risks to storms and extreme weather events that
are impacting, and will continue to impact, coastal infrastructures. Port
authorities and port administrators, together with state, federal, and
private agencies, can help port decision-makers in planning actions to
reduce or remove the barriers to increase the resilience of their ports in a
holistic manner. Through the fostering of collaborations, the burden of
plans and actions (resources, time investment, and expertise) can be
shared. Greater involvement of port tenants, and diverse port
stakeholders, would increase the understanding of the risks and generate a
greater sense of responsibility. A first step in the process of resilience
building is drafting/revising emergency management plans and/or risk
assessment plans.
Barriers to adaptation will always exist. However, today’s decision-making
will increase or decrease the future adaptive capacity of the country’s
ports. The ability to take gradual steps in incremental adaptations will
better prepare port administrators in sustaining their missions while
facing increasingly challenging climate conditions and increasing extreme
weather incidents. Port decision-makers should reach out to policymakers,
insurance providers, and others to help maximize future investments and
extend the resilience and lifetime of the ports’ infrastructure.
By interviewing different key experts in each port, consensus on whether
their ports are threatened by climate and extreme weather events is
quantified, and the perceived barriers to extreme weather adaptation and
the concept of seaport vulnerability are characterized. Also, the practices
and circumstances that are locally relevant across the studied ports can be
determined. The methodology used in and the insights resulting from this
pilot study can be applied to other areas/categories in the future,
providing a road map for tactics to address the adaptation barriers and
the strategies to address them — addressing the shortfall of adaptation
strategies for adaptation to extreme weather currently available to ports.
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Appendix A: Port Decision-Makers’
Perceptions on Climate and Extreme Weather
Vulnerability
Ground truthing in this study follows the development of a quantitative
vulnerability index for ports (McIntosh et al. 2019). The index can be used
to assess relative vulnerability measurements across multiple ports,
identifying those at higher risk to impacts from extreme weather events.
Along with the vulnerability index, identification of barriers to extreme
weather adaptations can help in understanding the concerns that may
impede the development of resilient ports. The value of the model is
strengthened by ensuring the results capture stakeholders’ input and local
circumstances and practices. This helps in identifying the barriers to
adaptation that are most relevant to those working in a port. Further, the
involvement of decision-makers in the development process increases the
likelihood that study outputs will be integrated into their local decisionmaking processes.
Responses by decision-makers on their understanding of the vulnerability
of the ports were organized using the IPCC definition of vulnerability
(Appendix E).
Although all groups mentioned vulnerability in terms of adaptive capacity,
the assessment on decision-makers’ perceptions of the concept of port
vulnerability found that a majority (80%, 24/30) explain it in terms of
exposure and sensitivity (Table A-1). However, safety planners had the
largest percentage of its group (80%, 4/5) link vulnerability and adaptive
capacity. An explanation could be that these individuals, who address port
safety daily, most clearly see the connection between adaptive capacity and
the ability to respond to an extreme weather event.
Table A-1. Distribution of the responses by the three categories of decision-makers. Values
are presented in the percentages for each group of respondents. The total number of
respondents was 30.
Components of
Vulnerability

Directors/Managers
(N = 17)

Environmental
specialists (N = 8)

Safety Planners
(N = 5)

Exposure

82.4%

75%

80%

Sensitivity

70.6%

87.5%

100%

Adaptive Capacity

17.6%

25%

80%
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Port exposure to climate and extreme weather events was explained in
terms of exposure to SLR, high winds, blizzards, and flooding events that
could impact the physical infrastructure, facility, and cargo and that could
also affect vessels, people, and systems. Disruptions would slow down,
delay, or prevent the port’s functioning, affecting the economic viability of
the port and its ability to deliver goods. Together with the port, waterfront
properties, waterways, and marshlands are also viewed as vulnerable and
exposed. Similarly, in sensitivity terms, these surrounding areas, local
population, and key ecosystems would have a higher frequency of rain,
storm, and surge impacts. Beyond impacts to physical infrastructure,
extreme events also generate social and economic impacts. Depending on
the nature and verity of the storm and the force of winds, the port’s
function could be delayed or crippled. The weather event could also cause
long-term physical damage and shut downs. Stored cargo could be
destroyed or lost. Coasts could experience erosion, and channels could
accumulate more than the usual sediments.
This appendix explains that a port’s level of vulnerability, in terms of
adaptive capacity, is strongly tied to its decision-makers’ understanding of
the risks and potential impacts and acting upon that knowledge. This is of
interest to this study, as the adaptive capacity element of the vulnerability
component had the lowest ranking during the expert evaluation process
(McIntosh et al. 2019). As mentioned earlier, study respondents most often
explained vulnerability in terms of a port’s exposure and sensitivity. Few
explained it in terms of adaptive capacity (Table A-1 of this Appendix A).
In addition to explaining vulnerability as it relates to climate and extreme
weather (Table A-2), some respondents mentioned their concern that the
port’s tank farms could be vulnerable to terrorism.
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Table A-2. Decision-makers’ perceptions on the vulnerability of ports.

Vulnerability Component Decision-Makers’ Vulnerability Perceptions
Exposure to natural hazards, SLR, higher frequency of
rain, storm surge, floods, heavy wind, blizzards.

Exposure

Impacts on physical infrastructure (e.g., tank farms),
water ways, waterfront properties, coastal degradation,
connectivity systems, peoples, the economy.
In general terms, impacts on port functions, damage to
facility equipment (e.g., containers knocked down by
heavy winds), disruption of connectivity systems (e.g.,
trains over marshlands), delivery of goods. (Impacts
may vary as a function of the age of infrastructure.)
Sensitivity to natural hazards (see exposure).
Impacts on physical infrastructure (tank farms,
containers), coastal landscapes, navigation,
accumulation of sediments in the channels.

Sensitivity

Degree of impacts. The sensitivity of the port is a
function of the severity of nature (e.g., what the storm
brings).
This is also influenced by the elevation of the
landscape, age of infrastructure at the port.
Once impacted, ports are affected with delays,
damage, destruction, loss or crippling of the port’s
functions.
When ports lose their connections to people and
waterways, this results in economic loss, shut downs,
absence of goods (e.g., heating oil). Hence, all port
stakeholders and their connection systems are
susceptible,
In general terms, port is described as being prepared,
having knowledge and awareness of risks, having the
ability to restore functions and ensure business
continuity.

Adaptive Capacity

Planning. Knowledge that mitigation makes a
difference in the port’s vulnerability
Active. Port has a contingency plan or an Office of
Environmental Management.
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Appendix B: Communication Inviting
Participants
Subject: **IMPORTANT** URI Seaport Resilience Project

Dear Decision maker [Name],
My name is Dr. Elizabeth Mclean; I am a research associate in the
University of Rhode Island’s Marine Affairs Department, where I specialize
in port resilience and extreme weather adaptations. At URI we are conducting a
series of interviews with port representatives as part of a funded study with the USACE's
Engineer Research & Development Center to understand seaport vulnerability to extreme
weather events.
We are speaking with key port decision makers about long term planning and investment
for resilience (see attachment). We are interviewing port directors/ managers, safety
planners and environmental risk specialists at the 23 medium and highuse ports of the USACE North Atlantic Division who have knowledge about extreme weather
planning and/or investments. Ten ports have already participated in our study. Please let us
know when you are available, your input is highly valued and essential to this research!
I can be reached at 401-874-7083.
Thank you in advance,
Elizabeth Mclean

---

Elizabeth L. Mclean PhD, Research Associate | Department of Marine Affairs | Coastal Institute | University of Rhode
Island
1 Greenhouse Road, Suite 205, Kingston, RI 02881 | Email: elmclean@uri.edu | Phone: 401-874 -7083 | Web:
http://web.uri.edu/abecker/dr-elizabeth-mclean/
“A mechanism of world intercommunication will be devised, embracing the whole planet, freed from national hindrances
and restrictions, and functioning with marvelous swiftness and perfect regularity.” Shoghi Effendi 1936
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Appendix C: Project One-Pager Description
Shared with Port Decision-Makers.
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Appendix D: Consent Form (IRB) and Interview
Instrument
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Mclean & Becker
Decision Maker Barriers to Extreme Weather Adaptation for Seaports: A
Cultural Consensus Model for Medium and High-Use Ports in the North
Atlantic
Demographics
1. Name of the port

________________

2. What is your position? _______________________________________
3. Number of years you have been working as a port manager/safety
planner/environmental specialist? _______
Understanding Barriers
4. Do you feel your port has done enough to address extreme weather concerns? (why or
why not?)
_______________________________________________________
5a. Does your port have a management plan that considers long - term planning for
natural hazards resilience? (Y/N) ___
5b. Are there some short-term actions to be planned to increase resilience?
_______________________________________________________
5c. Which, if any, extreme weather impacts does this address? Which other
natural hazards? ____________________________________________
6. What are some of the challenges to implement extreme weather adaptation actions at
your port?
_______________________________________________________
7. You mentioned challenges to implementing adaptation actions (Q7). What resources
would enable you to overcome these challenges? ________________________
8. What could happen to your port if needed adaptations to extreme weather were not
addressed?
_______________________________________________________
Conceptualizing Seaport Vulnerability to extreme weather impacts (the CCM)
1. What does “seaport vulnerability to extreme weather impacts” mean to you?
_______________________________________________________

ERDC/CHL CR-19-??

2. Which components of the physical infrastructure of your port are exposed to:
a. extreme weather tide-related flooding? ___________________
b. surge damage? ______________________________________
c. or extreme temperatures? _________________________________
3. How would the exposure of your port change with a predicted sea level rise of 2 feet in
the next two years?
_______________________________________________________
4. How does your port prepare for an imminent storm (Adaptive Capacity)?
_______________________________________________________
5. Compared to other ports in the North Atlantic, what is one thing your port is doing
well to increase its ability to prepare to extreme events or natural hazards?
6. Sensitivity is explained by the level to which a system is changed or affected. This can
cause problems or lead to new opportunities. What facilities of your port do you consider
to be sensitive to extreme weather impacts? ____________________________
7a. How do you think your port would cope if the sea level would rise by 2 feet in 2020?
_______________________________________________________
7b. How does this prediction change in the face of a storm? _____________________
8. The following natural hazards are already impacting some ports in the US. Which ones
are you most concerned about? How would you rank them? (4, high – 0, low):
__ Extreme Temperatures
__ Extreme Precipitation
__ Sea level rise
__ Extreme Coastal Storms (high winds and surge)
__ Tidal flooding
Other:
_____________________________________________________
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Appendix E: Terminology Used in the Study
Adaptation is defined as “any adjustment in natural or human systems in
response to actual or expected climatic stimuli or their effects, which
moderates harm or exploits beneficial opportunities”(IPCC 2012).
Barriers are defined as factors that delays or prevents actions and plans to
implement an adaptation, or an investment towards resilience.
Cultural Consensus Model is a method used in the social sciences to
distinguishe patterns of socially transmitted knowledge that people use to
interpret the world and make decisions ((Romney et al. 1987)). It uses a
mathematical model to derive estimates of experts competence and
cultural shared knowledge ((Romney et al. 1987)).
Decision-makers for the purpose of this study, consist of port directors or
managers, safety planners, and environmental specialists charged with
decision-making in the chosen ports.
Indicators are measurable, observable quantities that serve as proxies for
an aspect of a system that cannot itself be directly, measured (Gallopin
1997; Hinkel 2011).
Resilience is the capacity to prepare, resist, recover, and adapt to a
disturbance, such as a major storm event (CARRI 2013; Rosati et al. 2015).
Also, Walker posits the “ability of a system to absorb disturbance and still
retain its basic function and structure” (Walker et al. 2006).
Risk is the probability of an event to damage critical components of the
infrastructure. Although potential outcomes are often uncertain (IPCC
2014), these are often measured monetarily as it relates to the physical
components of a facility/system, loss of function (interruptions), cost
repair, and stabilizing conditions (debris removal, etc.).
Seaport here collectively refers to the collocated real property and
infrastructure involved in the loading and unloading of cargo from
maritime vessels. These are port, facilities, locks, etc. Lacking a universally
accepted method for delimiting for port boundaries, and recognizing that
some seaports span multiple counties, this study of port vulnerability
considers a port as an inextricable part of its local socioeconomic and
environmental systems.
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Vulnerability is defined as “the propensity or predisposition to be
adversely affected . . . including the characteristics of a person or group
and their situation that influences their capacity to anticipate, cope with,
resist, and recover from the adverse effects of physical events” (IPCC 2012,
p. 32).
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Appendix F: Cultural Consensus Model (CCM)
(output)
No. of negative competencies: 0
Largest eigenvalue: 14.282
2nd largest eigenvalue: 4.905
Ratio of largest to next: 2.912
The weak eigen ratio indicates lack of fit to the consensus model--most
likely, your respondents are drawn from a mix of two cultures.
Competence
Scores
1
______
1 0.139
2 0.456
3 0.614
4 0.547
5 0.729
6 0.547
7 0.687
8 0.527
9 0.762
10 0.547
11 0.981
12 0.166
13 0.216
14 0.981
15 0.323
16 0.981
17 0.762
18 0.981
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19 0.476
20 0.067
21 0.981
22 0.981
23 0.981
24 0.981
25 0.610
26 0.751
27 0.516
28 0.729
29 0.687
30 0.125
ITEM 1: Governance Disconnect
Response Frequency Wtd. Freq.
----------- ----------- ----------0
10
7.07
1
20
22.93
ITEM 2: Lack of Communication
Response Frequency Wtd. Freq.
----------- ----------- ----------0
28
29.51
1
2
0.49
ITEM 3: Lack of Funding
Response Frequency Wtd. Freq.
----------- ----------- ----------0
7
4.20
1
23
25.80
ITEM 4: Lack of Understanding of Risks
Response Frequency Wtd. Freq.
----------- ----------- ----------0
2
1.32
1
28
28.68
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ITEM 5: Perceived Risks does not meet Action Threshold
Response Frequency Wtd. Freq.
----------- ----------- ----------0
9
5.79
1
21
24.21
ITEM 6: Physical Constraint
Response Frequency Wtd. Freq.
----------- ----------- ----------0
10
6.62
1
20
23.38
ITEM 7: Problem is Overwhelming
Response Frequency Wtd. Freq.
----------- ----------- ----------0
28
28.83
1
2
1.17
Answer Key

1
2
3
4
5
6
7

Barriers to Adaptation
----------Governance Disconnect 1.00
Lack of Communication 0.00
Lack of Funding 1.00
Lack of Understanding of Risks 1.00
Perceived Risks does not meet Action Threshold 1.00
Physical Constraint 1.00
Problem is Overwhelming 0.00

78

ERDC/CHL CR-19-??

Appendix G: Lessons Learned from the Port
Authority of New York and New Jersey
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Appendix H: Abbreviations and Acronyms
ADA

American Disabilities Act

CCM

Cultural Consensus Model

CENAD

Corps of Engineers North Atlantic Division

DIR

Port Director

ERDC

U.S. Army Engineer Research and Development Center

ES

Environmental Specialist

FEMA

Federal Emergency Management Agency

IPCC

Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change

NOAA

National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration

NRC

National Research Council

SLR

Sea Level Rise

SP

Safety Planner

USACE

United States Army Corps of Engineers (U.S. government)

USCG

United States Coast Guard
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Unit Conversion Factors
Multiply
feet

By
0.3048

To Obtain
meters

miles (nautical)

1,852

meters

miles (U.S. statute)

1,609.347

meters

miles per hour

0.44704

meters per second

yards

0.9144

meters
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